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Saddam Hussein’s patrimonial coercive rule reshaped major aspects of the Iraqi 
state and society, providing structures and motivations that have fueled resistance in the 
wake of regime change.  By linking literature describing the effects of Ba’ath rule on the 
Iraqi state, society, and individual to the characteristics and motivations of the resistance, 
a more nuanced understanding of the complex landscape of Iraqi transition is possible.  
Repressive regimes produce a lasting and complex legacy in the structures of state and 
society that they leave behind.  This legacy is often contentious and unpredictable, 
complicating efforts toward a democratic transition.  This thesis concludes that, in the 
case of Iraq, patrimonial coercive rule produced a set of Sunni sub-state power structures 
that coveted the state and personal powers enjoyed under the old system.  This sub-state 
landscape has proven to be difficult terrain for a successful transition, producing a 
network of actors that resist for varied motives.  Exploration of the case of Iraqi transition 
reveals a demand for balanced political and military policies that address the socio-
political roots of the resistance as well as the violent symptoms.  Military initiatives alone 
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On April 9, 2003, the world watched as jubilant Iraqis and U.S. Marines toppled 
the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad’s Firdaus Square, symbolically ending the 
Ba’ath reign of terror.  Chaos lurked nearby, however, as the start of rampant looting 
hinted at the instability to come in Iraq.  The toppling of that statue symbolized the 
removal of the ruthless dictator who had dominated Iraq for decades, but it also yielded 
the first glance at what lay beneath the regime that had governed Iraq since the late 
1960s. 
In the two years since the fall of Baghdad, coalition forces have been engaged in a 
deadly campaign against a resistance that sprouted out of the chaos following Saddam 
Hussein’s ouster.  The predominately Sunni Iraqi resistance is a loose network of groups 
with disparate motivations, but a vague common goal of rejecting the new order in Iraq.  
This loose network defies easy categorization, owing to complex roots in Iraq state and 
societal structures.  An understanding of the roots of the resistance is critical, for it: (1) 
provides the opportunity to explain the current phenomenon; (2) provides a solid basis for 
planning political and military counter-resistance measures; and (3) provides an example 
that may assist in predicting contentious legacies and latent structures in future cases of 
transition following the fall of a regime.1   
The pronounced effects of Saddam Hussein’s rule on the Iraqi state, society, and 
individual have been catalogued by scholars, exiles, and journalists.  A growing body of 
literature and journalism attempts to describe the nature of the resistance or insurgency 
ongoing in Iraq, yet many facile categorizations of resistance groups overlook the 
complex legacy of the old regime.  The complicated set of motives and structures that 
underlie the resistance can be fully understood only by tying the literature regarding the 
effects of Saddam’s rule to the current explorations of insurgent characteristics.  The sub- 
  
 
                                                 
1 The explain, plan, predict verbiage is borrowed from Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, 
“Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics 24 Supplement: Theory 
and Policy in International Relations (Spring 1972): 40. 
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state power structures left as a legacy of Saddam’s patrimonial regime can be linked to 
the motives and organization of actors in the resistance by considering contemporary Iraq 
as a case of transition from autocratic rule.   
Saddam Hussein’s patrimonial coercive rule reshaped major aspects of the Iraqi 
state and society, providing structures and motivations that have fueled resistance in the 
wake of regime change.  By linking literature describing the effects of Ba’ath rule on the 
Iraqi state, society, and individual to accounts of resistance characteristics and 
motivations, a more nuanced understanding of the complex landscape of Iraqi transition 
is possible.  Repressive regimes produce a lasting and complex legacy in the structures of 
state and society that they leave behind.  This legacy is often contentious and 
unpredictable, complicating efforts toward a democratic transition.  In the case of Iraq, 
patrimonial coercive rule produced a set of Sunni sub-state power structures that coveted 
the state and personal powers enjoyed under the old system.  This sub-state landscape has 
proven to be difficult terrain for a successful democratic transition. Exploration of the 
case of Iraqi transition yields balanced political and military policy implications that 
address the socio-political roots of the resistance as well as the violent symptoms.  
Success in Iraq cannot be won by military means alone, but must come from a balance of 
security and political consensus that will yield a majority of Iraqi Sunnis willing to isolate 
violent rejectionists in pursuit of political engagement.   
Former regime elements, Sunni nationalists, Islamic extremists, tribal elements, 
and criminals taking part in the resistance were all shaped by the legacy of Saddam’s 
rule.  All had motives to resist the new order facing Iraq, largely owing to their place in 
the power structure of the old regime.  It is supremely important that analysts and policy 
makers approaching a case of transition clearly understand what enduring structures and 
motives lie beneath the former regime.  By examining Iraq as a case of transition, the old 
order and the current events can be linked, making sense of the violence and producing 





A. FRAMING THE RESISTANCE PROBLEM IN IRAQ 
Senior U.S. officials were caught unawares by the emergence of resistance to 
regime change in Iraq and were resultantly slow to acknowledge the nature of the 
problem.2  In August 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld defined the resistance 
as a group of “dead-enders… those remnants of the defeated regimes who’ll go on 
fighting long after their cause is lost.”3  Subsequent events have demonstrated that the 
resistance in Iraq is much more complex.   
Many of the earliest combatants were remnants of the former regime, but they 
were often tied into other Sunni structures by kinship or tribal identity, religion, and 
Sunni nationalism.  Resultantly, Sunni nationalists, radical Islamists, tribal forces, and 
criminals soon followed this vanguard into the chaos of violent resistance.  Not all of 
these forces were admirers of the former regime, but many held links to former regime 
staffers and most held rejection of occupation and Shi’a dominance in common with the 
former regime elements (FREs).  Instead of being dead-enders, the FREs became the 
kernel around which a network of resistance groups formed.  The FREs were not a 
leadership hub, but a violent vanguard willingly followed by others.  The resistance 
network consists of groups that are motivated by a spectrum of ideologies, ranging from 
purely parochial motives, through a fusion of Islam and nationalism, to radical Islamist 
ideologies.  The varied nature of resistance groups demands a nuanced understanding of 
the underlying structures and motivations from which they arose. 
The rapid formation of the resistance suggests the existence of latent structures 
upon which it was based.  The resilience of resistance activity despite the removal of 
numerous high-level figures suggests that the resistance is a horizontal organization 
without the vulnerabilities of hierarchical command.  The ability of the resistance to 
expand in scope and membership implies that the resisters are not dead-enders, but have 
served as a cadre, attracting more fighters through various motivations and connections.  
Despite these strengths of the resistance, it lacks the singular, overarching political goal 
                                                 
2 See Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 173. 
3 Donald Rumsfeld, “Speech to Veterans of Foreign Wars,” (transcript of speech, San Antonia, TX, 
August 25, 2003), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030825-secdef0403.html, (accessed 
October 5, 2005). 
4 
and strategy characteristic of a classic insurgency.  These observations require a different 
analytical framework than the model of classic insurgency.   
A model which is helpful in explaining the chaotic nature of current Iraq is found 
in literature on regime transition.  This body of work examines the process through which 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes transition to a new form of rule and identifies how 
the legacies of the old regime affect the negotiation of new political relationships 
between actors.4  The framework of transition assists in tracing the characteristics of the 
resistance back to the legacy of structures of pre-invasion Iraq. 
Scholars of democracy carefully studied transitions experienced in Latin America 
and Europe in the post-World War II era.5  These studies put forth a set of expectations 
regarding the process of transition and the pre-existence of factors that portend a 
successful outcome of transition.  These expectations fit well with the earlier western 
cases of transition.  Some of their observations about the likely role of regime hard-liners, 
security institutions, and societal structures are salient in the Iraqi case of transition.  The 
different circumstances of transition, the complex legacy of Saddam’s patrimonial rule, 
and the different state and societal structures extant in the Middle East and much of the 
developing world demand a modified set of theoretical assumptions and expectations.     
O’Donnell and Schmitter expect regime hard-liners to be a key center of 
rejectionist sentiment.6  Military and security officials are also expected to be dangerous 
if not isolated from rejectionist politicians looking for muscle.7  Authoritarian rule is 
expected to reshape societal structures, thrusting them into a new role in relation to the 
state that is not easily forgone during the transition.8  These expectations have proven 
relevant to the Iraqi case, however, the theorized role of civil society, rational state 
institutions, and regime soft-liners (expected to be critical in the creation of political 
                                                 
4 Inter alia Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. Transitions From 
Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).  
This literature will be reviewed below. 
5 O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, as well as many others, focus on these transitions. 
6 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 16. 
7 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 32. 
8 Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 3-4. 
5 
opening and a successful, democratic outcome) is not observed in Iraq.  Here, critical 
modifications to the basic transition theories are required. 
The prevalence of neo-patrimonial regimes in the developing world9 and the 
robust patrimonial coercive apparatus common in regimes in the Middle East10 make it 
unlikely that a concerted or pacted transition will be initiated from within most states.  
Neo-patrimonial regimes and their patron-client relationships yield a personalistic, rather 
than rational-legal institutional rule.  Regime elites tenaciously hold on to political power 
and personal spoils.  Transition is unlikely to occur until a severe crisis or collapse 
occurs.  Societal cohesiveness is expected to be poor, nothing like the strong civil society 
that has helped the public mobilize in earlier cases.11  Furthermore, regimes’ desire to 
maintain a hold on power and spoils is aided by robust patrimonial coercive services, 
funded by oil and strategic rents in the Middle East.  These security institutions are seen 
as a major impediment to transition in the region12 and they figure prominently in Iraq. 
Iraq lacks the civil society and institutions guided by rule of law that have aided 
the process of democratic transition in previous cases.  At the same time, Iraq was 
plagued by a strong patrimonial-coercive regime, as well as traditional institutions of 
primary identity that exacerbate the chaos of an ethnically and religiously divided country 
undergoing transition.  Linking the latent institutions and motivations that were a legacy 
of Saddam’s rule to the current phenomenon of resistance will demonstrate the difficulty 
of effecting democratic transition in the face of challenges presented in the developing 
world.   
Numerous works examine the structures of the former regime and their effect on 
society.  Baram has written a number of works that address Hussein’s survival strategies 
                                                 
9 Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in 
Africa,” World Politics 46, no. 4 (July 1994): 457-460.  Christopher S. Clapham, Third World Politics: An 
Introduction, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 48-49. 
10 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in 
Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (January 2004). 
11 Bratton and Van de Walle, 460-464. 
12 Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism,” 145-150. 
6 
of building layered security structures,13 as well as the extension of control mechanisms 
into social structures.14  Numerous sources detail the structure of regime military and 
security organizations and their effect on Iraq.15  Kanan Makiya and others have 
examined the effect of regime oppression and economic hardship on the Iraqi society and 
culture.16  The state of religiosity in Iraq and the use of Islam for regime legitimation 
have been briefly addressed by Thaler17 and Post and Baram,18 along with numerous 
journalistic accounts.   
Together, these works depict a weakened state with layered security services and 
an extensive and corrupt patrimonial support structure.  Security structures were a heavily 
patronized and redundant web of power centers that struck fear into society.  The security 
state reshaped tribal and familial structures, as well as social norms.  Furthermore, the 
massive security sector yielded a large number of military-trained Sunnis and a profusion 
of arms cached in state depots and distributed to loyal tribal and local militias.  These 
facts bear significantly on the resistance. 
These works have informed the recent literature on the resistance; however, there 
has been no methodical attempt to explicitly link pre-invasion structures to the shape of 
the resistance in occupied Iraq.  Several scholars warn that patterns of conflict, division, 
and patronage have characterized Iraq since World War I and that these patterns are 
likely to remain an important force which must be reckoned with in post-Saddam Iraq,19 
                                                 
13 Amatzia Baram, Building Toward Crisis: Saddam Husayn’s Strategy for Survival, (Washington DC: 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998).  Amatzia Baram, “Saddam’s World: Political Discourse 
in Iraq,” The American Political Science Review 95, no. 2 (2001): 491. 
14 Amatzia Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies 1991-1996,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 29, no. 1 (1997): 1. 
15 Inter alia, Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Ahmed 
S. Hashim, “Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 4 (2003): 29. 
16 Shereen T. Ismael, “Dismantling the Iraqi Social Fabric: From Dictatorship through Sanctions to 
Occupation,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 35, no.2 (2004): 333. Kanan Makiya, Republic of 
Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989). Qais N. al-Nouri, 
“The Impact of the Embargo on Iraqi Families: Re-Structuring of Tribes, Socio-Economic Classes and 
Households,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies  28, no. 2 (1997): 99. 
17 David Thaler, “The Middle East: The Cradle of the Muslim World,” in The Muslim World After 
9/11, ed. Angel M. Rabasa, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), 118. 
18 Jerrold M. Post and Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam,” The Counterproliferation 
Papers Future Warfare Series 17, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 2002), 50. 
19Inter alia  Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 169-170.  
Charles Tripp, “After Saddam,” Survival 44, no. 4 (October 1, 2002). 
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yet this theme has not been fully elucidated in examinations of the resistance.  Many 
works since the fall of the regime are primarily descriptive of the resistance.20  Other 
works address structural issues behind the fractured resistance such as sectarianism and 
nationalism.21  Hoffman’s description of the resistance as a network of actors rather than 
a singular entity22 fits well with the varied structures and long-term goals arising from the 
fractured pre-invasion structures.  These works discuss factors in pre-invasion Iraq that 
weigh on current issues, but there has been no effort to capture the essence of transition: 
the chaos of old legacies confronting new realities. 
Analysis of the available, open-source information on the resistance, as will be 
described and documented below, yields several observations.  First, the resistance does 
not have a unified, long-term political goal, strategic vision, or leadership.  The goals of 
former members of the regime, Sunni nationalists, and Islamic extremists are often 
mutually exclusive.  Thus, the resistance is not a single, unified insurgency, nor is it 
likely to be in the foreseeable future.   
Second, these disparate groups share an interest in instability and ejection of 
coalition troops as short-term goals.  They all reject the current trajectory of the 
transition.  To pursue short-term goals, some groups are able to set aside their long-term 
differences and come together to carry out specific operations.  Understanding the 
potential of the Iraqi resistance to operate successfully in a networked fashion is critical 
to developing a means for combating the phenomenon. 
Third, the majority of the resistance consists of Iraqi Sunnis.23  Over ninety 
percent of detainees and the overwhelming majority of resisters killed have been Sunni.24  
                                                 
20 Inter alia, Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Insurgency in Iraq,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 14, no. 3 
(2003): 29.  Steven Metz, “The Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly 27, 
no. 1 (2003): 25. 
21 Ahmed Hashim, “Iraq’s Chaos: Why the Insurgency Won’t Go Away,” Boston Review (October 
2004) http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.5/hashim.html (accessed October 27, 2005).  Andrew Terrill, 
Nationalism, Sectarianism, and the Future of the U.S. Presence in Post-Saddam Iraq, (Carlisle, PA:  
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003). 
22 Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand National 
Security Research Division, 2004). 
23 Inter alia Hashim, “The Insurgency in Iraq.” Peter Maass, “The Way of the Commandos,” The New 
York Times Magazine, May 1, 2005.  Steven Metz, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 28. 
8 
Shi’ites have not figured significantly25 and the foreign component is overshadowed by 
the largely Iraqi Sunni face of the resistance.  Only 370 of 14,000 detainees held by U.S. 
forces by June 2005 were foreign26 and experts estimate that 4 to 10 percent of the 
fighters at large are foreign.27  
The Sunni resistance consists of two main elements:  parochial Sunni nationalists 
and Sunni Islamists.28  Parochial Sunnis can be further dissembled into Saddamists, ex-
Ba’athists (not necessarily supporting of Saddam), nationalists, and tribal elements.29  
These elements, their form, and their agenda can all be traced back to foundations in the 
social conditions and the web of power centers in pre-invasion Iraq.  None of them wish 
to see Sunni power lost in a new Iraq, but many of them have different ideas as to what 
form that Sunni power should take. 
Only by examining the resistance as a set of actors shaped by patrimonial 
coercive rule and the survival strategies of a weakening state, can the situation in Iraq be 
fully understood.  Emphasis on guerilla warfare and insurgency models has resulted in 
efforts to describe who is fighting and how they are fighting.  Examining the resistance as 
a case of transition helps to illuminate the equally important questions of where the 
resistance actors arose from and how their structures and motivations fit into the 
changing Iraqi state and society.  Pursuing this analytical framework has significance 
both for the study of Iraq and for the study of the phenomenon of transition in general.  
Defining the Iraqi resistance as part of a case of transition also has significant strategic 
implications.  It implies that the problem is largely one of politics and, therefore, the 
                                                 
24 Anthony Cordesman, “Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency,” working paper, (Washington DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, August 5, 2005), 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/050805_iraqi_insurgency.pdf  (accessed November 2, 2005) 41. 
25 Cordesman, “Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency,” 37. 
26 John F. Burns, “Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh Trail,” New York Times, June 5, 2005. 
27 Dan Murphy, “Iraq’s Foreign Fighters: Few But Deadly,” Christian Science Monitor, (September 
27, 2005). 
28 Ian Beckett, Insurgency in Iraq (Carlisle PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 
2005) 4.  
29 Amatzia Baram, “Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Rebels in Iraq,” United States Institute of Peace 
Special Report 134 (April 2005),  http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr134.html (accessed November 
2005 ) 3-9. 
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solutions must be a balance of military and political initiatives to provide security and an 
acceptable way forward for a consensual political system in Iraq. 
Under the old order, the various elements now fomenting resistance enjoyed 
relative autonomy and usurped state power in their own ways.  The regime used elements 
of Sunni society to support its rule and in turn granted perks and patronage to cement 
loyalty.  The beneficiaries of this system constituted a power structure that lay beneath 
the official regime.  As the power of the state weakened due to wars and sanctions, 
Saddam increasingly relied on ruthless and personally-profiting security officials, 
powerful tribes, organized criminals, and religious leaders to ensure stability and loyalty 
in key areas.  These powerful individuals and groups in society were relatively free to 
carve out a domain of power and relative comfort as long as it did not jeopardize 
Saddam’s position.  The legacy of Saddam’s rule is the network of sub-state and former 
state elements that mobilized to resist their loss of power in a new Iraq. 
The resistance is not a carefully crafted Ba’athist plan, but it is a result of the 
former regime’s manipulation of Iraq for its own ends.  The elements of Iraq’s sub-state 
power structure, despite their very different outlooks, have been able to mobilize against 
the new order and operate in a networked manner, the actions of each serving to reinforce 
the overall instability.  A hard core of former regime elements was among the first to take 
up arms against the occupation.  Radicalized Islamists and Sunni nationalists soon 
followed.  Ranking members of the regime have provided funding and support to many 
resistance groups.  Lower-level security and military members have provided fighters to 
the range of resistance cells.  Tribal and kinship ties have expanded the range of potential 
supporters of these groups and inactive individuals have at times been prompted to take 
up arms in vengeance for the death of kin.  The resistance is thus a complex web of 
groups and motivations (see Figure 1) that can be best explained in the context of the old 
order in Iraq.  The existence of latent motivations and organizational structures 
underneath the lid of Saddam’s rule that would resist a new order in Iraq has important 
implications for strategies of regime change.  Examination of the case of Iraqi transition 
will demonstrate that legacies of the old order must be addressed promptly in order to 
safeguard transition toward a better form of rule. 
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The following pages will lay out the roots of the resistance in the political and 
social structures of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.  These roots shape the structure and 
preferences of the resistance actors, resulting in rejection of the current path of Iraq’s 
transition from repressive rule.  Viewing the Iraqi problem in the context of other cases of 
transition from authoritarian and totalitarian rule will help to develop this argument. 
 
B. PUTTING THE IRAQI PROBLEM IN CONTEXT 
The resistance in Iraq is different than many of the classic cases of insurgency 
because it has arisen in the context of an externally influenced transition.  It is not the 
product of a deliberate process of internal mobilization against the sitting regime, nor is it 
a unified group that has started a campaign to lead to political transition.  The Iraqi 
resistance is a reaction that formed rapidly in the ongoing chaos of transition; therefore, 
understanding the nature of transition is important to the Iraqi situation.   
Ranking Former Regime Elements provide financial and other support 
Lower-level Former Regime Elements join motivated activists as trained 
resistance fighters 




 Sunni nationalist 
groups follow 
Tribal / kin 
connections 
Tribal / kin 
connections 
Tribal / kin 
connections 
11 
Iraq forms an atypical and important case within the literature on transition from 
authoritarian or totalitarian rule.  An influential framework for the study of transitions 
was put forward by Rustow, who placed “countries where a major impetus came from 
abroad” as outliers that should not be included in a systematic examination of transition,30 
yet “externally monitored installation”31 has been cited as the method of transition most 
likely to result in democracy.32  Therefore, this important type of transition is 
underrepresented in transition literature. 
Due to the fact that externally-monitored transitions are rare cases, 
methodologically excluded from much of the literature; the case of Iraq provides an 
important addition.  Regardless of the outcome, Iraq also provides the first look at 
attempted transition in the Arab Islamic world.  It provides many unique insights from 
this perspective.  Other Arab states with some similar structures are likely to undergo 
some form of transition in the future and insights gained here may assist in predicting and 
planning for problems in their transition.  Furthermore, examination of the effect of the 
regime on Islamic structures and motivations in Iraq may provide insight into specific 
factors which exacerbate Islamic extremism, rather than rehashing the discussion of 
Islam’s inherent compatibility or incompatibility with democracy. 
The externally-monitored transition in Iraq is not without comparative cases, but 
it is much different than its precedents.  The most frequently cited examples of this 
category, West Germany and Japan, are not widely representative for a number of 
reasons.  Bellin points out that strong state institutions, relatively high economic 
development, ethnic homogeneity, historical experience of democratic processes, and 
unifying elite leadership distinguish the cases of Japan and West Germany from the 
                                                 
30 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative 
Politics 2, no. 3 (April 1970): 346. 
31 Alfred Stepan, “Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations,” in 
“Part III: Comparative Perspectives,” Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, ed. 
Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), 65. 
32 Gretchen Casper and Michelle Taylor, Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 18. 
12 
situation in Iraq.33  The central position of these countries in the worldwide capitalist 
system also defies comparison to transitions farther from the center.34   
Faleh Jabar lists three factors that help to situate the specific case of Iraqi 
transition within the larger body of literature.   First, Iraq has been conditioned by 
totalitarianism.  In this manner, transitions of states like Germany and the former Soviet 
Union may hold some parallels.  Second, Iraq is an oil rentier state.  This fact has shaped 
Iraq’s political economy, its bureaucratic structure, and its patronage networks.  There are 
no solid comparisons of oil rentier state transitions in the literature.  Third, “Iraq is a case 
of a failed state in a multiethnic and multi-cultural setting, with social groups structured 
in modern, traditional, and hybrid forms of social organization.”35  While there are 
numerous cases of transition in somewhat similar circumstances, the salient cases of 
externally-monitored installation most often cited (Germany and Japan) are vastly 
different.  These three factors interact significantly to create a contentious legacy for 
transition.  The pitfalls in Iraq are numerous and have created a violent resistance that 
must be understood in the context of its socio-political roots, rather than its tactics. 
In order to understand the roots of the resistance, the literature on pre-invasion 
Iraq will be reviewed to demonstrate the effect of Saddam’s rule on state and society.  
This review will emphasize the empowerment of sub-state structures and the reshaping of 
Iraqi society in order to create a support base for Saddam’s continued rule.  Transition 
literature will be used as a guide in the review of pre-invasion Iraq to point out important 
features predicted to prove contentious.  The review will then be linked to the current 
resistance in Iraq to demonstrate how the legacy of Saddam’s rule has played out in the 
chaotic arena of political transition.  Academic accounts will be used to some extent to 
describe the resistance, but weight will be given to first-hand accounts and interviews of 
Iraqis and insurgents themselves to describe the state of resistance in Iraq.     
  
                                                 
33 Eva Bellin, “The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective,” 
Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 601. 
34 Stepan, “Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations,” 71. 
35 Faleh A. Jabar, “Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy,” United 
States Institute of Peace Special Report 120 (May 2004), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr120.pdf 
(accessed October 26, 2005), 3. 
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C. SIGNIFICANCE OF IRAQ AS A CASE OF TRANSITION 
It is important to situate Iraq within the literature on transition for two reasons.  
First, as mentioned above, Iraq is an important addition to the body of cases on transition 
due to its position as an outlier.  Second, examining the case of Iraqi resistance within 
this framework provides a basis for comparison to other cases of transition and provides 
some insight as to how the conclusions drawn may be used to inform policy.  This 
approach implies that the outcome in Iraq will depend more on political than military 
factors.  Finally, the legacies of the previous regime and their effect on latent institutions 
in Iraq point to a need for revisiting the assumptions of transition scholarship. 
In a traditional military encounter, war has been considered “a continuation of 
political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”36  The linkage of military 
operations to political ends has been traditionally considered only at the highest levels of 
command in a hierarchical military.  Lower commanders, executing the plans of senior 
officers, considered operational and tactical factors that were primarily military in nature.  
In a conflict such as the one in Iraq, the adversary has little or no hierarchy to effect the 
division of labor that separates tactical considerations from political considerations.  In 
most cases, cells and insurgents become militarily active for political (or religious-
political) reasons and engage in operations that are believed to serve this political vision.  
In a decentralized campaign, like the one in Iraq, the political considerations are even 
more prominent as each cell is less encumbered by a centralized ideology and doctrine.  
Therefore, the socio-political background to the war in Iraq is critical to creating a 
balanced set of political and military implications that can guide policies that successfully 
affect the trajectory of the transition process. 
Within the literature on transition, there are two views of the trajectory of 
transition processes and how that trajectory may be affected.  Structure-based approaches 
emphasize the burden of history on the outcome of the transition process.  Thus, path 
dependency and institutional legacy are highly limiting factors on design of post-
transition institutions.  On the other hand, agency-centered theorists believe that correct 
policy choices can facilitate a break with the past, allowing the state to forge ahead with 
                                                 
36 Carl von Clausewitz, “Book Eight: War Plans,” On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter 
Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605. 
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new institutions.37  These categories have been bridged with a framework of “path 
contingency” in which policy choices are the independent variable, institutional outcomes 
are the dependent variable, and state capacity and institutional legacy are intervening 
variables.38  In this framework, understanding the legacy of the previous regime is crucial 
to informing properly timed and implemented policy aimed at the political and military 
aspects of the resistance. 
The sub-state power structure that was a legacy of the previous regime calls into 
question the feasibility of a “plug and play” version of regime change.  The surgical 
removal of a regime, followed by the rapid emplacement of a new government, will not 
produce instant stability.  Many layers of state and society beneath the pinnacle of the 
regime have been reshaped by the old order.  The sub-state power structure must be 
addressed in the policy of transition in order to heighten the chances that actors will buy 
in to a new political system.  Such a system is likely to be a second-best solution for all, 
requiring careful cultivation for success.   Furthermore, the process of adjustment to the 
new order is likely to be long and chaotic.  Finally, the establishment of a new political 
system does not guarantee stability if major elements of society do not participate in the 
system and accept the trajectory that such a system takes. 
At the bottom line, policy-guidance for transition situations must start with a 
pragmatic assessment of the legacy of the former regime on the institutions and servants 
of the state, the societal structures within the state, and the individuals of that society.  
Potentially rejectionist sentiments should looked for in those who stand to lose power 
enjoyed under the old order.  Even in the most repressive regimes, there must be some 
base of support in the state and society.  Coercive apparatuses must be staffed, societal 
structures and leaders must be co-opted, and the rest of society must be cowed into 
obeisance.  These are not legacies that can be erased overnight.   
Aggregation of sub-state actors into blocs that support differing trajectories for 
the new order should be anticipated.  The negotiation of these blocs should be expected to 
be chaotic and probably violent to some extent.  Participation in politics is not a sign of 
                                                 
37 Juliet Johnson, “Path Contingency in Postcommunist Transformations,” Comparative Politics 33, 
no. 3 (April 2001): 254. 
38Johnson, 255. 
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success, but only a hopeful beginning.  The blocs must negotiate a compromise.  This 
will often be a second-best solution, reached only when the actors see that their preferred 
outcomes are unobtainable.  Only when such a compromise is agreed upon and enacted, 
can the consolidation of transition begin to tread on more stable ground. 
In Iraq, this means that Sunni participation in the vote on the constitution is a 
start, but it does not portend an end to the violence.  A vote against the constitution, 
against the trajectory of the new order, is not an agreement to that new order.  Only if 
Sunnis turn out to vote for members of parliament and only if they feel that their interests 
are safe in parliamentary procedure will Iraq’s future begin to look more promising.  At 
such a point, many Sunnis may begin to realize that they can acquiesce to a second-best 
solution of democratic engagement in Iraq.  The issues of Iraqi politics are complex, but 
the bottom line is that Sunnis will continue to resist violently until they feel that they can 
attain an acceptable status in democratic politics.  Thus, a solution to the violence in Iraq 
is likely to be largely political and only partly military.   
Viewing Iraq as a case of transition explains the political motives behind actors’ 
resistance to the new order.  Linking the legacy of pre-invasion Iraq to current events also 
helps to illustrate the mechanisms by which the resistance regenerates itself.  The 
linkages between the resistance fighters and the Sunni Iraqi society at large as well as the 
political nature of rejection of the new order suggest that military tactics such as large 
sweep and clear operations designed to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy are 
unlikely to succeed without accompanying political success that isolates the resisters 
from their societal support bases.  Military means alone will not precipitate a peaceful 
political solution.  Conversely, a political solution will not convince all of the fanatics in 
the resistance to lay down their arms.  Military means will be needed to target these die-
hards once they are isolated from a Sunni population willing to accept a peaceful political 
solution.  Military and political strategies must be well crafted and mutually supporting 





D. OVERVIEW OF THE CASE 
The situation in Iraq will be analyzed with reference to the contextual framework 
of transition.  In Chapter II, transition literature will guide an exploration of the effect of 
Saddam’s rule on Iraq.  It was in this time period that Saddam’s legacy was built in the 
form of layered security institutions and a sub-state power structure of societal actors was 
cultivated to secure Ba’ath rule.  The resistance that arose from this legacy to reject the 
transition will be explored in Chapter III.  The implications of the structure of the 
resistance will be examined in Chapter IV to determine implications for a successful 
balanced policy in Iraq.  Finally, Chapter V will provide some conclusions about the 
lessons of transition in Iraq as they bear on the future of that state and indicate some areas 
for consideration in future cases of transition.  A more sophisticated approach to 
transition is required, starting with reevaluation of basic assumptions derived from the 
European and Latin American cases and culminating in a more nuanced typology of 
regime attributes that impact the transition process and actors. 
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II. A CRUSHING LEGACY:   
THE EFFECT OF SADDAM’S RULE ON IRAQ 
Saddam Hussein’s rule over Iraq left a lasting legacy that has resulted in the chaos 
facing Iraq today.  Saddam manipulated the institutions of state and society in order to 
support his rule.  This manipulation produced long-lasting effects on state institutions, 
societal structures, and individuals in Iraq.  Many Sunni Iraqis became part of a 
significant patrimonial network of security services and traditional structures that secured 
Saddam’s rule.  Saddam carefully doled out patronage and state power to centers that 
were meticulously cultivated to be loyal, or at least not threatening, to his continued rule.  
When the regime fell and a new order confronted the ruling minority, the legacy of sub-
state power structures that lay within the Sunni community produced both motivation and 
organizational advantages that a hard core of Sunnis used to resist the transition.  
Saddam’s removal of any alternative leaders in Sunni society virtually ensured that no 
coherent voice would be able to unify the Sunnis politically to shape the transition.  Thus, 
a dispersed network of violent Sunni cells became the only audible Sunni voice in a 
period of transition where the legacy of old structures confronts the trajectory toward a 
new order.  Iraq is not a clean slate, but is haunted by the crushing rule of Saddam 
Hussein and the Ba’ath Party.  These legacies are in open confrontation with new 
political forces in Iraq.  This is the essence of transition. 
 
A. LESSONS OF PREVIOUS TRANSITIONS 
Rustow’s work and the case studies that followed provide some salient points for 
investigation and comparison in Iraq.  O’Donnell and Schmitter stress the uncertainty of 
the transition process, largely rising from the unpredictability of the “’standard’ actors” in 
the transition process.  These actors are “likely to be divided and hesitant about their 
interests and ideals and, hence, incapable of coherent collective action.”39   
The active restructuring of social institutions by authoritarian regimes is a major 
factor in this uncertainty.  Religious, military, and other social institutions are thrust into 
an “active political role” that is not easily forgone during or after a transition.  As a result,                                                  
39 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 3-4. 
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“institutions and groups cannot revert back to their preauthoritarian behavior or 
structures.”40  Through the reshaping of existing institutions and rules and the creation of 
new ones, “the legacy of authoritarianism is a radical restructuring of the political 
arena.”41   
In this restructured political arena, several key rejectionist sectors are likely to 
arise.  The “main core” of regime “hard-liners” is likely to resist a transition away from 
the order which empowered it.42  Likewise, the military and security institutions are 
strong centers of rejectionist potential.43  These likely suspects operate widely in the case 
of Iraqi transition.  Examples of totalitarian transition suggest that this class of security 
officials cannot be easily uprooted by regime change.44  The rejectionist tendency 
extends beyond this core, however. 
Saddam’s regime was like many other regimes that “systematically seek to alter 
the traditional roles of important social institutions.”45  The Ba’ath regime destroyed 
traditional social institutions and reformed them in service of the state.46  The tribes and 
Islamic structures were reconstructed to some degree as legitimating and controlling 
influences for the state.  The roles of these institutions as sub-state power centers in pre-
invasion Iraq produced a legacy of activity that set them up as another potentially 
rejectionist sector in the aftermath of regime change.  The expansion of resistance from a 
cadre of regime “dead-enders” to other Iraqi nationalists and Islamists was aided in some 
cases by ties of identity and in others by Islamic ideology of resistance.  This not to say 
that Islamists and Iraqi nationalists are supporters of the Ba’ath, but violent resistance 
spread to these sectors rapidly, aided by the reshaped and radicalized tribal and religious 
structures.   
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These legacies weigh heavily on the preferences of the actors and the structure of 
their interactions.  Many actors have become accustomed to a degree of power and 
autonomy that cooperation with the former regime afforded them.  Other actors see the 
opening as their chance to take up arms for a radically new future.  The various actors 
operating in the chaos of post-invasion Iraq are in the process of negotiating, peacefully 
or violently, for their vision of the best-case future.  This vision is shaped by the legacies 
of the past.   
Rustow observed that “conflict and reconciliation are essential to democracy.”47  
Actors in a transition are likely to become polarized around different visions of the 
future, testing the sense of national unity to its limits.  A state divided regionally is likely 
to experience secession, while a state divided along other lines of distinction may 
experience “wholesale expulsion or genocide.”48  Iraq is divided along regional, 
sectarian, and ethnic lines, adding to the difficulties of transition.  If the polar conflict 
does not degenerate into absolute ends, the negotiated solution may result in democracy.  
Such a negotiated compromise will be “second-best to all major parties involved.”49  The 
ability of the parties to successfully negotiate a solution will be heavily influenced by the 
legacy of the previous regime. 
If the visions of fractionalized actors spawned by transition are not compatible, 
violent conflict will ensue.  The Iraqi resistance is a manifestation of Sunni rejection of 
the trajectory of transition.  The resistance is likely to continue until a critical mass of 
Sunnis believe that their fate is better left to political engagement and acceptance of a 
second-best solution than violent resistance.  Once a majority of Sunnis believe they have 
a political future in Iraq and that violence is jeopardizing that future, the resistance will 
truly become the last gasp of a few dead-enders.  In order to determine what the end state 
might be, the roots of the Sunni actors must be examined.   
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B. THE HARD CORE: STRUCTURES OF SECURITY AND 
ADMINISTRATION 
Violence has been a central part of Iraqi politics since the time of the Ottoman 
Empire.50  The rule of Saddam Hussein was the pinnacle of this trend.  Under his rule, a 
hard core of regime security servants penetrated society with surveillance structures and 
used a high level of coercive violence.  The legacy of this violent security state is a cadre 
of former regime members who have motive to resist transition and access to structures 
and tools that assist them in this resistance. 
An important group of actors in transition is the “main core of the hard-liners” of 
the former regime.  These individuals are expected to be the source of dogged resistance 
during the transition.51  Saddam created a loyal and well-trained hard core of Ba’ath party 
hacks and security servants in Iraq.  In many cases, this hard core identified personally 
with the fate of the regime.  Understanding the motivations and structures of this hard 
core yields insight into their power as a cadre for resistance. 
While a dictator can be easily removed, “a totalitarian regime creates a whole 
class of rulers” that defy such removal attempts.  The regime replaces existing political 
and social structures with its own institutions and a class of “professional organizers, 
supervisors, and rulers.”  This class of regime collaborators cannot be removed as can a 
dictator or junta and they will fight for their lives if the regime is upended.52  A large 
number of complicit members of the former regime are now fighting for their lives and 
for what they perceive as their Iraq. 
Bellin cites the “robust and politically tenacious coercive apparatus” of regimes in 
the Middle East as a key factor in securing states against the opening of democratic 
transition.  In the patrimonial regimes of the Middle East, flush with oil rents, the security 
services are not rule-bound.  “Staffing decisions are ruled by cronyism; the distinction 
between public and private mission is blurred, leading to widespread corruption and 
abuse of power; and discipline is maintained through the exploitation of primordial 
cleavage, often relying on balanced rivalry between different ethnic/sectarian groups.”  
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Security officials often abuse their public role for profit and power, leading to a “personal 
identification with the regime and the regime’s longevity.”  Under such conditions, 
“political reform represents the prospect of ruin for the elite of the coercive apparatus.”53  
In contrast, a “rule-governed, predictable, and meritocratic” coercive apparatus is more 
likely to be willing to “disengage from power and allow political reform to proceed.”54  
Members of a patrimonial coercive apparatus, like the one in Iraq, are likely to reject a 
transition that removes them from their position of power.   
The security services in Iraq fit well into the model of a patrimonial coercive 
apparatus.  The Sunni Arabs picked to man the security services were tied by family, 
clan, and tribe to the ruling elites.  As the reign of Saddam continued, those in positions 
of power maintained their place only by personal allegiance to the ruler and demonstrated 
complicity in regime coercion.  Those who remained in service gained impressive status 
and perquisites.55  Thus, service in Iraqi security institutions became a personal venture 
as much as a public one, solidifying the individual’s identification with the status quo and 
increasing the perceived costs of change immensely.  As predicted by transition 
scholarship, Iraqi security elites faced personal ruin in the political reforms.  Their 
membership within a well-armed, violent, and penetrating network of state security 
offered the attractive alternative of violent resistance to these reforms. 
This potentially rejectionist sector is large in Iraq.  The average country in the 
Middle East employs 16.2 men per thousand in the security sector, compared to 6.31 in 
France or 3.92 in Brazil.  Iraq employed 20.94 men per thousand in the security services 
in 2000.56  The highly patrimonial and personalized rule of Saddam created a huge sector 
of well-trained, well-armed, and well-connected Iraqis who stood to lose considerably 
under a new order in Iraq.   
These potential rejectionists were parceled into numerous security structures and 
often distributed in offices throughout Iraq.  This kept them from forming a bloc capable 
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of action against the regime, but also made their remnants cellular and difficult to root out 
after collapse.  Furthermore, the size and pervasiveness of this sector is important to 
understanding its place in the effects of Saddam’s rule on the Iraqi society and individual.  
On their own, these hard-liners may, in fact, be “dead-enders.”  The power of such hard-
liners is greatly enhanced by their ability to act as a cadre that other actors in society may 
follow. 
The military and security institutions, even outside the hard core, form a 
potentially rejectionist sector if not rehabilitated, provided with an honorable role in the 
transition, and insulated from politicians who may use them to consolidate power.  The 
degree to which the military was separated from acts of regime repression in past cases 
directly impacted the military’s stance toward democratization.  In cases where 
repression was “less brutal and extensive,” a “policy of clemency would seem most 
viable and least dangerous for democratization.”57   
In the case of Iraq, the hard core was obviously unredeemable, but the degree of 
military involvement in day-to-day repression was certainly far less than that of the state 
security instruments.  Most security officials never re-emerged publicly, but average 
soldiers and officers were not afraid to demonstrate for pay in the aftermath of the 
invasion.  These soldiers were dismissed to fend for themselves by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority.  Some of these soldiers were ripe for the picking by elements 
willing to pay for the use of their military skills in the resistance.  In the areas of 
leadership and finance, the hard-liners were able to act as a cadre, drawing 
disenfranchised soldiers into the resistance.  These soldiers resist for different motives 
than those of the hard core.  They resist in order to make a living, to avenge the 
humiliation of unemployment, or to support a vision of nationalism.  They do not resist in 
die-hard support of the Ba’ath or due to their personal complicity in or identification with 
the regime. 
1. Creating a Hard Core:  Staffing the Regime Center 
The Ba’ath regime used a number of methods to produce security servants who 
identified with the regime on personal, ideological, and primary identity bases.  
Inculcation of loyalty to the regime was a long process that started with programs for                                                  
57 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 28-32. 
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school age children and culminated in the portfolio of incentives and threats that  
maintained compliant security servants.  The lifelong process of indoctrination produced 
a hard core of supporters of the status quo that were likely to reject a new order that 
disabused them of their power. 
The indoctrination of selected Iraqis into the Ba’ath apparatus began in primary 
school with an organization called the Pioneers.  Youths could join the Vanguards 
(tala’i’) at 10 and the Youth Organization (futuwwa) at 15.58  These organizations 
promised a bright future and fed into a party structure that conferred many perks to eager 
young men.  Aspiring members received fast-track promotions and preferred jobs in the 
public sector in return for new recruits and information on “disloyal” Iraqis, but the most 
ambitious and adventurous Sunni Iraqis were often drawn to the security services.59  
State security officers had tremendous power, wielding unmitigated control over Iraqis 
they surveilled, detained, and often tortured.  They were regarded with fear and 
deference, a fact which set them up for many perks such as protection money and elite 
treatment.60  Such power cannot be easy to give up, especially when one faces the 
possibility of retribution for egregious acts.  The security services were used to “perform 
sufficient atrocities… as to ensure that they have nowhere else to go.”61  For these 
reasons, the hard core of the regime is faced with the highest costs in a new regime. 
Leaders within the security services were further conditioned through a 
combination of patronage and coercion.  Perks and bonuses were at times lavished on 
bosses throughout the structure,62 but could just as easily be revoked.  This was 
accompanied by the fear of being the subject of an informant’s revelation of some 
transgression, real or imagined.  In this “system of spying on spies” no one was immune 
from the grips of fear.63  The effect was a dependence on the regime for continued 
personal success and survival. 
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Some responded to the environment of fear and invasion of privacy by identifying 
wholly with the regime and the party.  Psychologically, some individuals sought to 
become complicit in the activities of the regime as a way of liquidating “their personality 
and selves into the oppressor ‘group’ and its values.”64  In a similar observation, an 
expert on gang behavior noted that once individuals joined a gang, they were able to 
increase the “intensity and scope of violence” without personal remorse because they felt 
that the direction of gang leadership absolved their personal responsibility in the act.65   
For many reasons, the individuals in Iraq’s violent organizations were likely to identify 
with the group and become complicit in the violence. 
In many Sunni areas, regime employment was the predominate way of life.  In 
one town, Dhulu’iyya, the local police commander explained that “just about every 
family had someone working in security or the army or some government job… it was 
normal to join the Ba’th party – it was like a rule.”66  In the same town, a 57-year old 
former regime security officer struggled to understand how the job that he had once been 
so proud of now caused him to be treated poorly.  “Was serving the country some sort of 
crime? … We were on top of the system.  We had dreams. … Now we are the losers.  We 
lost our positions, our status, the security of our families, stability.  Curse on the 
Americans.”67  These Sunnis lost the only way of life they knew.  Whether complicit 
criminals or proud servants, many former regime employees reject the new order in Iraq. 
Iraq’s security organizations were populated by willing servants who identified 
with the regime and personally gained from their positions.  These Iraqis were part of a 
networked and layered security structure that ranged widely across Iraqi society and 
government.  These individuals were well-trained, well-networked, and well-positioned 
to take up resistance when the time came. 
2. Institutions of Iraqi Security 
The Iraqi security apparatus was vast.  It consisted of multiple layers of 
organizations with overlapping missions and mutual suspicion and surveillance.  These                                                  
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institutions were carefully balanced to ensure that no service or cell gained the power to 
threaten the regime itself.  All elements of this apparatus reported directly to Saddam, 
further emphasizing the theme of personal fealty to the leader and not the state.68  Most 
of the security and intelligence services maintained regional offices throughout Iraq,69 
spreading the reach of the regime and the breadth of the security network.  When the 
central element of the regime was removed from the picture, these security organizations 
melted away, leaving a network of small cells in key locations throughout Iraq that 
continued to resist. 
The central organ in Saddam’s security decision-making apparatus was the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), consisting of Saddam and his closest 
associates.  In this body rested control of the state, the Ba’ath Party, and the military.70  
All of the individuals in the RCC were personally invested in Ba’ath rule.  The lines of 
patrimonial distribution and control often went from Saddam, through RCC members, to 
networks in the security structure and society.  Therefore, RCC members held 
considerable access to funding, societal support, and portions of the security services.  It 
is not surprising that several members of the RCC have been implicated as key figures in 
the resistance, especially in funding and coordinating activities.71  The numerous security 
organizations that existed below the RCC provided a network of cells of well-trained and 
loyal Iraqis that RCC members could fund to resist the new order in Iraq. 
The Ba’ath Party also provided a structure consisting of a number of 
compartmentalized and secretive cells.  These cells provided an excellent structure for the 
networking of resistance.  The basic element of Ba’ath Party organization was the cell; a 
unit consisting of three to seven men.  Two to seven cells constituted a division, two to 
five divisions made up a section, two sections fell into a branch, and the branches all fell 
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under the regional command.72  This cellular organization is very similar to that of 
insurgent forces such as the Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale,73 underlining the 
potential utility of such a structure for those wishing to resist occupation. 
a. Security Services 
The Special Security Organization (SSO, Amn al-Khass) was the most 
powerful arm of the security services.  Agents for the SSO were hand-picked from other 
agencies for their loyalty.  The approximately 5,000 members of the SSO were largely 
drawn from Tikrit, Huwayja, and Samarra and received better compensation than the 
members of other services.  This core security service was responsible for presidential 
security, monitoring other security services and government agencies, gathering 
information on officials and relatives of Saddam, and numerous other critical functions.  
The SSO also controlled the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard of the Iraqi 
military.74  This arm appears to have been the lead agency in wide-ranging cooperation 
with the Soviet KGB for intelligence training and technology transfer.75  Members of this 
service had access to information on most influential Iraqis, as well as ties to elites in 
government and the military.  The SSO contained “educated and highly intelligent men” 
whose loyalty to the former regime was “iron clad.”76  Therefore, the SSO may provide 
the hardest of the hard core resistance, with connections to funding, military might, and 
influential Iraqis through cells of well-connected, well-trained and well-armed agents. 
The General Security Service (Al-Amn al-‘Amm) was charged with 
monitoring for economic and political crimes.  It held extensive files on average Iraqis 
and had access to informers across the country.  With units in every police station,77 the 
General Security Service had the potential to provide local cells of rejectionist individuals  
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across Iraq.  The pervasive nature of this service likely yielded a large number of enemies 
in society.  Thus, regime change is a personal threat to some officers of the General 
Security Service. 
The General Intelligence Service (GIS, Al-Mukhabarat al-Amma), or Iraqi 
Intelligence Service (IIS, Jihaz al-Mukhabarat al-Iraqi), was the security and intelligence 
arm of the Ba’ath Party.  It had the missions of conducting “sabotage, subversion, and 
terrorist operations against neighboring countries such as Syria and Iran,” and funding 
opposition groups.78  Foreign operations also included assassinations and coercion of 
Iraqi dissidents abroad.  The GIS went so far as to open offices in several foreign states.  
At home, the service was used to monitor grass-roots organizations, Shi’a, Kurds, 
potential opposition groups, and foreigners.79  Its members were chosen primarily for 
political loyalty, rather than for any job skills.  This loyal cadre was also used to oversee 
the other security, military, and bureaucratic services and ensure their fealty to the 
regime.80  Due to their previous duties monitoring opposition groups within Iraq and 
neighboring countries, some officers may have had contacts to Islamic extremist groups 
that were useful once resistance began.81 GIS represents yet another group of loyal cells 
with training in clandestine activities and access both in Iraq and abroad.   
The Iraqi services abroad sought out support for the regime in neighboring 
countries.  These operations may have some impact on foreign involvement in the 
resistance because they activated Arab and Islamist support for the Iraqi people in the 
1990s.  Operatives worked in student unions and professional venues to garner support.  
A major focus of their efforts was Jordan where there were numerous graduates of Iraqi 
universities, many involved in organizing unions and rallies in “solidarity with the Iraqi 
people.”82  These efforts may have been assisted by parallel Islamist activism, as will be 
discussed below. 
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The Fedayeen were a paramilitary force created on October 7, 1994.83  It 
consisted of young Tikritis, trained by the Republican Guard.84  This force was 
considerably strengthened in 1996 and may have consisted of up to 100,000 men.85  The 
Fedayeen were involved in guerilla fighting during the initial invasion of Iraq. Former 
Fedayeen fighters are mentioned often in accounts of the resistance, as many members of 
this large force seem to have continued their unconventional battle as trained.86 
b. The Military 
The leadership ranks of the Iraqi armed forces were conditioned to assist 
in Saddam’s control of Iraq, making the military the largest tool for internal security. The 
Iraqi Army has had a long history as an “agent for internal repression,” but state control 
was refined under Saddam.  A series of purges removed potentially threatening leaders 
and the ranks were peppered with politically indoctrinated Ba’ath cadres who would not 
carry out critical orders without party approval.  Additionally, military officers were 
indoctrinated to identify with the Ba’ath party specifically, rather than with the nation.  
These measures mitigated the military’s propensity to interfere in politics in the interest 
of guarding the nation at large.87   
The Directorate of Political Guidance (Mudiriyat al-tawjih al-siyasi) 
controlled political commissars down to the platoon level, and sought to enforce 
discipline and politically indoctrinate the armed forces.  The security services and well-
placed informants maintained close watch over the military, leading to frequent turnover 
of key officials through rotation, retirement, or execution.  Such turnover prevented any 
figure from gaining enough power and popularity to pose a threat to Saddam’s rule.88   
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Military Intelligence (Al-Estikbarat al-Askariyya) was tasked with 
ensuring the loyalty of the Iraqi Army, as well as conducting unconventional operations 
during war and against foreign and domestic opponents.89  This organization reported 
directly to Saddam, rather than to the Ministry of Defense.  Estikbarat recruited 
informants in Iraq and abroad and ran a network of operatives in Jordan, Israel, the 
Occupied Territories, the Gulf states, Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Turkey, Yemen, and Iran.90  
Operatives took part in a number of operations abroad, including assassinations, 
intelligence gathering, and protection operations that reportedly took place in Beruit, 
Paris, London, Sweden, and possibly even Detroit.91  The network of support that was 
required to conduct such operations may still provide support to former members of the 
regime resisting occupation. 
The Special Republican Guard (Al-Haris al-Jamhuri al-Khas) was the 
elite core of the military.  This unit consisted of 12,000 to 15,000 active duty troops and a 
similar number of reserve troops.92  The main function of this unit was to protect the 
regime in and around Baghdad.93  These were the most loyal, well-trained, and well-
equipped military units and therefore the most likely to resist regime change.  
The Special Republican Guard was networked with many of the security 
services when it came to defense of the capital.  For example, a building in the Hayy 
‘Amil district of Baghdad housed a communications center where Special Intelligence, 
Special Security, and the Special Republican Guard coordinated operations.  
Interestingly, this center was responsible for security of the Airport Highway from the 
Republican Palace to the airport.  The center was also located next to the Umm al-Tubul 
Mosque.94  Both the Airport Highway and the Umm al-Tubul Mosque (renamed Ibn 
Taymiya) have become hotbeds of resistance activity.  Security service members’ 
intimate knowledge of the Airport Highway undoubtedly helped any who desired to 
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target coalition convoys on this road in the aftermath.  The close proximity of a security 
hub and a radical Islamist mosque also may have provided linkages between former 
regime members and Islamic extremists wishing to collaborate on resistance operations 
after the fall of the regime. 
Due to the politicization and conditioning of the military as a loyal tool of 
the regime, it was likely to “see any civil political movement as a rival and any civil 
movement that is Shi’ite or Kurdish dominated as a group of ‘traitors.’”95  The legacy of 
Ba’ath rule produced many military members that rejected the occupation and reshaping 
of Iraq.  Any proclivities toward Sunni nationalism and disdain for the occupation troops 
were well augmented by conditioned mistrust of the Shi’a and Kurds who became a 
dominant force in the new Iraq. 
The well-armed cadres of the dissolved security and military services “are 
people who know each other, have combat skills, understand discipline, have experienced 
commanders and share the same provenance.”96  These fighters present a fertile 
recruiting ground for any political elements requiring muscle in the transition.97  
Experience from earlier cases of transition suggests that military and security institutions 
should be provided with an honorable role in the transition and insulated from elites that 
may attempt to use them to vie for power.98  The Iraqi military and security services were 
disbanded in the aftermath of the invasion and any efforts to insulate them from politics 
failed.  Many FREs have become the muscle behind various resistance factions as 
financiers, facilitators, leaders, trainers, or foot soldiers.  FRE links into the Iraqi society 
and economy have assisted in the networking of resistance groups. 
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C. THE EFFECT OF THE REGIME ON ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND 
INDIVIDUAL 
The reign of the Ba’ath regime produced long lasting effects in Iraqi society.  
Saddam’s security state struck fear into individuals and erased virtually all civil society.  
The traditional structures that remained were actively reshaped to support the rule of the 
regime.  The economy was devastated by the cost of wars, sanctions, and the 
maintenance of a security state, further damaging the society and the individual.   
Scholars predict extensive damage to the state from totalitarian rule.  “Unlike a 
dictatorship, totalitarianism leaves behind a mutilated, deformed society, a ruined 
economy, exhausted resources, and general degradation.”99  The Ba’ath regime 
succeeded in ruining the Iraqi economy, atomizing Iraqi society, and erasing most forms 
of autonomous organization.  The social structures it could not completely remove, 
primarily Islamic venues and tribal structures, it attempted to reshape in support of the 
regime.  This created peripheral regime supporting structures and in some cases 
radicalized Islamist and tribal figures.  These structures and individuals are important to 
the trajectory of the transition. 
Long or severe oppressive rule breaks down independent institutions and civil 
society almost completely.100  The regime aims to depoliticize and atomize society, 
forcing individuals to focus on private matters rather than activities that might threaten 
the continued rule of the regime.  No “self-organized and autonomously defined political 
spaces” remain and only “the most highly motivated individuals” act outside of the 
bounds defined by the regime.101  There were no institutions of civil society remaining in 
Iraq.  The only structures immediately available were those of the former regime and 
traditional elements such as tribes and Islamic structures that had been greatly affected by 
Saddam’s rule.   
As state capacity waned in the 1990s due to wars and sanctions, the regime ceded 
state powers to supportive societal structures such as co-opted tribes and religious 
institutions.  Rampant organized crime and regime corruption also provided a shadow 
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economy that helped the regime maintain stability.  These structures were allowed to 
thrive in the later years of Saddam’s rule.  The state ceded powers to these structures that, 
in turn, assisted in maintaining control and stability.  The tribes were given jurisdiction 
over their areas and were allowed to exercise legitimate use of force with weapons 
provided by the regime.  Islamic institutions were used to legitimate the regime and 
enforce Islamic law.  Organized crime and corruption were allowed by the regime as a 
means to evade international sanctions and to keep the networks of patronage flowing.  
The diffusion of state powers helped Saddam to maintain his rule, but it reinforced sub-
state power structures, especially in Sunni areas.  These sub-state actors came to covet 
these powers that must be returned to state government in a new Iraq.  The sub-state 
power structures have motive to resist the new order and are well-positioned to undertake 
such resistance.  The roots of these structures can be elucidated by exploring the pre-
invasion economic and social status of Iraq. 
1. The Economy 
Like many cases of totalitarian transition that left a legacy of “a ruined 
economy,”102 the Iraqi economy was heavily damaged by wars, sanctions, and the cost of 
Saddam’s security state.  Damage was compounded by regime corruption and poor 
economic incentives emanating from Baghdad.  The restructuring of the Iraqi economy 
under embargo yielded a massive informal sector, endemic organized crime, and a 
destitute Iraqi society.  These legacies weigh heavily on post-invasion Iraq. 
Economic hardship was the norm for most Iraqis by the end of Saddam’s reign.  
The crushing burden of two costly wars and thirteen years of sanctions fell almost 
completely on the shoulders of Iraq’s people.  The average per capita income stood at 
$8,161 in 1979 and dropped to $2,108 by 1989, largely due to Iraq’s disastrous decision 
to go to war with Iran.  The 1991 Gulf War and the ensuing UN sanctions that embargoed 
commerce with Iraq compounded the damage.  Per capita income dropped to $609 in 
1992 and hovered around $500 by 1995.103  Gross domestic product stood at $47.56 
billion in 1980 and plummeted to an estimated $15.35 billion by 1997 before settling at 
$26.117 billion by 2002.  At the same time, Iraq’s population grew from 13 million in 
                                                 
102 Bukovsky, 15. 
103 Cordesman and Hashim, 124-127, 140.  
33 
1980 to 23.3 million in 2000.104  The effect of Iraq’s economic woes was far reaching; 
impacting social structures, norms, and individual well-being.  The economic 
environment of sanctions and state corruption led to a huge informal economy and a 
growing sector of organized crime. 
The public sector was a major source of income in the early 1990s.  An estimated 
822,000 Iraqis were on the state payroll in 1991, including civilian employees, members 
of the armed forces, and pensioners.  Forty percent of Iraqi households were dependent 
on state paychecks.105  This public sector shrank significantly in the 1990s, leaving many 
to “survive on their own wit and skill.”106  Those who did not lose their job often 
supplemented their paltry salary with income from corruption that served to feed their 
families.107  Many Iraqis turned to the informal sector for employment.  This “shadow 
economy” included some legitimate but unaccounted activities such as services, street 
vending, or begging, as well as the gamut of economic and organized crime that was 
rampant in the later years of Saddam’s Iraq.108   
It is estimated that the informal economy constituted approximately 30 percent of 
gross domestic product in 2000.  Extrapolation from other data sets provides an estimate 
that the informal labor force constituted just under 70 percent of the total labor force; 
around 30 percent of the total population.109  These figures point to the pervasive nature 
of unofficial employment in Iraq, which is a symptom of severe economic dysfunction.   
The perverse incentives of Iraq’s corrupt regime contributed significantly to this 
informal sector as well.110  Corrupt officials and restrictive laws made it difficult for 
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legitimate business to survive.  Many business owners avoided registering their 
businesses for fear of shakedowns by predatory officials.  Businessmen who kept a low 
profile might only have to bribe one or two officials who happened across their shop.  In 
contrast, legitimate businesses had to bribe a series of officials to get their business 
registered.  In addition, regular shakedowns from different ministerial officials could be 
expected once the business was officially listed.111   
The corruption and criminalization of the Iraqi economy eroded state power.  
Corrupt officials, black marketeers, and organized criminals gained power at the expense 
of the state. “A muted anarchy came to underlie the thin veil of a tightly surveilled 
society” and organized crime became a fact of life112 romanticized by a popular drama on 
Iraqi TV, “The Wolves of the Night” (Dhi’ab al-Layl).113  Rampant organized crime and 
general lawlessness after the fall of Saddam have significant roots in the conditions of the 
informal and criminal economies of the 1990s.  These sectors produced another set of 
Iraqis that would resist their loss of power under rule of law in a new Iraq.  Economic 
difficulties and pervasive corruption also heavily impacted social norms and individual 
well-being. 
2. The Society and the Individual 
The confluence of pervasive and violent security institutions, widespread 
corruption, and severe economic hardship had a profound effect on Iraqi society.  The 
security state produced “an all-embracing atmosphere of fear.”114  The “complicity of the 
masses” in informing and staffing the security institutions deepened the terror by making 
everyone a potential informer or tormentor.115  Saddam’s rule also destroyed the 
institutions of civil society that serve as a buffer between the people and the 
government,116  leaving the “shadow state” of patrimonial and coercive networks as the 
only means of controlling Iraq.117  Due to this legacy, the norms that lubricate the rule of 
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law in many states, such as the idea of “public service,” meritocratic promotions, and 
citizens’ rights were notably absent from the former regime,118 hampering the return to 
order and inflaming chaos and sectarian mistrust in the wake of regime change. 
The regime’s “system of spying on spies” instilled a “permanent condition of fear 
and insecurity” throughout the state.119  Saddam used a coterie of informers and 
supporters to manipulate the government.120  In turn, the state maintained a vast network 
of informers throughout Iraq to control the society.121 This network of paranoia and 
secrecy was a legacy that assisted the resistance in evading intelligence collection and 
terrorizing potential domestic informers.   
Over 500,000 Iraqis were part-time informants for state security institutions.122  
Some of these were enthusiastic participants, but informing was largely coerced.  One 
teacher explained that he resented having to inform, but those who “were too obvious” in 
their activities had to be sacrificed in order to staunch the pressures to produce 
information.123  The broad net cast by state-run informers shut down the natural 
discussions and “storytelling” of the people, allowing the regime to replace these stories 
with “fantastic lies” that went unassailed by the normal skepticism and criticism of 
society.124  The logic of such stories is a difficult legacy to overcome as paranoia and 
conspiracy theories are often better received than facts.   
The security state affected family discussions as well.  The natural openness of 
children in front of their teachers sometimes led to an admission of parents’ frank talk 
and resulted in detention of the parents.  Therefore, even non-Ba’athist parents “put on a 
show of support for the regime” and often encouraged their children to join Ba’ath 
organizations to protect them from suspicion. Furthermore, Hussein emphasized the 
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importance of inculcating Iraqi youth with a deep distrust of foreigners.125  The result 
was a generation of children who were thoroughly indoctrinated with Saddam’s 
propaganda, reinforced by parents’ feigned loyalty.  On the day of the regime’s fall, a 12-
year old lamented, “I’m sad.  The Americans have stolen freedom.”  Her father 
explained, “Until now, I haven’t been able to speak my feelings about him.”126 
Saddam openly stated that the Ba’ath were interested in using the children as a 
vanguard against the “backwardness” of their parents.  He asserted that any conflict 
“between the unity of the family and these mores” of the Ba’ath party “must be resolved 
in favour of the new mores.”127  These indoctrinated and radicalized youth provide a pool 
of Iraqis predisposed to resist foreigners and the new order in Iraq.   
The quality of these youths’ education also declined in the later years of the old 
regime.  Many teachers, unable to make ends meet, left their jobs or spent significant 
time working menial second jobs.  Children were also occupied in supplementing family 
income and unable to focus on their education.128  As a result, literacy rates among 15-24 
year olds were lower than those of 25-34 year olds in 2004.  The U.N. Development 
Programme points to these statistics as evidence of a decline in educational standards 
over the last decade.129   
At the same time, the 1990s saw a precipitous decline in the “social and moral 
mores” of Iraqi society, leading to a rise in crime and a willingness to excuse bad 
behavior as a product of “hard circumstances.”130  Widows and other women without 
anyone to support them turned to prostitution to survive.131  Crime became endemic in 
the later years of Saddam’s rule, during which criminals were involved in “oil smuggling 
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and other enterprises” through a “widespread, globally networked criminal operation.”132  
Even among normal citizens, tensions were high.  One Baghdadi related that his city had 
become “an angry place” due to the stress of severe economic hardship.  So many people 
are on edge, and can easily break into a fight at any moment.”133  One can see how this 
highly-charged atmosphere could give way to chaos.  It also fed into the rising religiosity 
of many Iraqis described below. 
The kingpins of smuggling and organized crime during the 1990s were known to 
Iraqis as “the cats of the embargo” (Qitat al-Hisar).  These newly rich entrepreneurs 
made fortunes off smuggled goods.134  One Iraqi observed that under embargo, the rich 
could do virtually anything except “say bad things about Saddam or compete with his 
family… In Baghdad there is no law.  You can kill, steal, do whatever you want.”135  
Furthermore, endemic smuggling perpetrated by organized criminals and tribal gangs 
created well-established smuggling routes through the Al-Qaim, Al-Rutbah, and 
Qusaybah areas that have proven particularly useful for infiltrating foreign fighters.136  
Crime and corruption are a legacy that eroded Iraqi social norms and produced 
individuals resistant to the new order.  Some of these criminals have simply continued 
their criminal enterprises, while others have actively aided or engaged in resistance. 
Economic hardship due to the embargo also greatly altered the social networks of 
Iraq.  Sanctions devastated the middle class, forcing up to 63 percent of professionals to 
find employment as laborers.137  The damaged class structure in Iraq is yet another 
handicap against national unity.  Many of the new rich do not have the traditional skills 
and education held by the former middle class of Iraq that are needed to successfully run 
a country and reconstruct civil society.138  Professionals, such as doctors or engineers, 
were often unable to make ends meet, while manual labor or even criminal activity 
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became comparatively much more profitable.  These facts, along with an impoverished 
educational system, threaten to create a generation without a strong middle class.139  The 
disruption of the class structure contributes the instability in Iraq and serves the 
resistance. 
Within Iraq, numerous sectors had become accustomed to the power they attained 
by operating on the margins of the weakened state.  These included personally-profiting 
state officials, criminals, and ruthless profiteers. Members of traditional structures also 
gained significant power in Saddam’s search for supporters in the later days of Iraq. 
 
D. REINTRODUCING TRADITIONAL STRUCTURES IN SUPPORT OF 
THE REGIME 
Years of oppressive rule and harsh conditions fragmented Iraqi society into a “set 
of equally weighted” individuals, uprooted from their traditional identity.  These 
individuals were reconstructed into a new, state-centric network.140  In this “new 
society,” identity was primarily defined by each individual “being held in check by the 
same kind of personal loyalty [to the state], however constructed (conviction, complicity, 
self-interest, fear).”141  Those who identified with the state out of conviction, complicity, 
or self-interest present the largest problems for the transition.  As Saddam’s ability to 
control Iraq waned, traditional elements were re-emphasized to extend the reach of the 
regime center, creating another sector that coveted its power under the old regime. 
Saddam appeared to have an iron grip on Iraq, but his survival required constant 
manipulation.  The crises of the 1980s and 1990s eroded Saddam’s legitimacy 
significantly.  Saddam bolstered his failing base of support by turning to traditional 
institutions, specifically the tribes and Islam, as the power of the Ba’ath Party and its 
ideology waned.142  The regime’s manipulation of these traditional structures produced a  
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legacy of activism, power, and autonomy that would not be readily ceded to the 
centralized rule of law in a new Iraq.  These societal structures also provided latent 
networks for resistance activity. 
The regime was unable to completely eradicate structures in the “private and 
social domain” such as family, kin, and religion.143  Traditional, identity-based social 
groups provided a refuge from state-induced fear.144  Religion provided “frightened and 
atomized individuals” with an identity apart from Saddam’s “new society.”145  Tribal 
structures provided more visceral protection in the uncertain environment of Iraq in the 
form of armed protection and dispute mediation.  These structures were the subject of 
regime patronage and co-optation in the decade before the coalition invasion. 
The reconstruction of tribal and Islamic institutions is particularly important 
because these institutions emerged from regime change largely intact.  These institutions 
were radicalized to some degree, leading to their easy entry into violent resistance.  Islam 
has provided potent advantages to resisters able to capitalize on ideological and 
organizational aspects existing in Iraq and tribes extend support structures around 
resistance groups through ties of identity. 
1. The Tribes 
Tribes were important to the regime in several ways.  First, key positions in the 
regime and in the military and security services have long been staffed from a Sunni 
tribal base that has provided societal support for Saddam and his henchmen.  This 
mechanism of tribalism within the regime has been termed “etatist tribalism.”146   
Second, as the reach of Baghdad receded with the weakening of the state, the regime 
ceded state powers to the tribes, such as responsibility for maintaining order and ensuring 
loyalty to the regime in their areas.  Administration and law enforcement by the tribes 
replaced state structures in what has been termed “social tribalism.”147   
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Saddam’s tribal policies have important implications for transition.  First, 
tribalism within the regime caused a segment of Sunni society to link their identity with 
political power.  Second, the rise of tribalism in the periphery created a social structure 
that holds and covets state powers.  Finally, renewed emphasis on tribes and tribal honor 
produces an impetus for vengeance and a mechanism for enforcement against 
collaboration with the coalition.   
a. Tribalism within the Regime 
When the Ba’ath gained power by coup in 1968, the small group of Ba’ath 
elites set about securing their precarious position with zeal.  A central part of this 
campaign was to mobilize clan solidarity within the regime’s military and security 
services.  Tribal ties extended the regime’s base in society, provided loyal recruits for its 
coercive structures, and helped to create cohesion and trust amongst members of the 
regime center.148  
Saddam’s al-Bu Nasir tribe and their allies, approximately 50,000 in 
number, formed the core of regime patrimonial distribution networks.149  The regime 
elites came largely from a smaller group, the Beijat subclans.150  Members of supportive 
tribes were concentrated in the most influential security services.151  Elements of tribes 
that supported the regime also benefited handsomely from the arrangement.  Perks of 
regime patrimonialism included influential positions and lucrative government 
contracts.152  The result was newly-rich and newly-powerful individuals within the tribal 
system that owed their position to the regime.   
Spooked by coup plots, Saddam installed members of less important tribes 
in organizations like the Special Republican Guard, patronizing a wider base of tribes.153  
Lacking a strong social power base, these individuals were more reliant on the patronage 
of Saddam and therefore more likely to remain loyal.  This strategy also served to deepen 
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the complexities of the power structures in Iraq.  The linkage of primary identity to 
positions of political power in the old order leads some to feel cheated out of their 
rightful position in the new Iraq.  Furthermore, the tribal support of the old regime 
widens the potential base of support and manpower for hard core resisters.  
b. Tribalism in the Periphery 
The regime used tribal control to extend the reach of the state in the face 
of waning capacity.  The rising power of tribal structures was an indigenous phenomenon 
that the regime recognized and co-opted.154  Since social tribalism was not a regime-
induced phenomenon, but one that grew out of the social conditions of Iraq, these social 
institutions remain powerful in the wake of the invasion and bear significantly on the 
resistance. 
The regime allowed tribal authorities to handle matters of local law and 
order and to mediate disputes within the tribe and between tribes.  In some cases, 
multiple tribes entered into agreements that standardized “blood money” payments for 
assaults or murders.  Mediation of such disputes, along with collection of taxes and fees, 
provided tribes with revenue and rising power within the state.155   
The regime formalized its relationship with the tribes in 1996 when it 
basically revived the tribal laws of the mandatory period, installing tribal leaders as the 
intermediaries between the government and the people in tribal areas.  The new functions 
of these tribal leaders included tax collection.  Sheikhs were allowed to keep a share and 
send along the remainder as “tribute.”  Tribal leaders were also given control of a portion 
of the development budget to spend on local initiatives in their domain.156   
Tribal leaders were given a reduced military conscription quota to fill as 
they chose, rather than direct conscription of tribal members by the state.157  Saddam 
armed neighborhood and tribal militias with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, 
mortars, and even howitzers, as an extension of state control and a guard against “future 
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problems.”158  These tribal militias were activated to protect important locations in 
several cities in November and December 1998 due to heightened tensions with the 
U.S.,159 demonstrating their role in support of the state.  In sum, the regime ceded state 
powers to the tribes, which became autonomous entities in many areas with state license 
to use violence if necessary within their domain.   
These new centers of power were difficult to manage.  Tribal justice began 
to rival state justice as tribal authorities mediated disputes and crimes within their 
regions, including murder.160  Bureaucrats without tribal affiliation complained of 
powerlessness and confrontation between state bureaucracies and tribes became 
increasingly common.  This led, in some cases, to tribal assassination of regime 
functionaries such as policemen and judges that were adversely involved in tribal 
affairs.161   Tribal organization also spawned gangs that undertook an alarming amount of 
criminal activity, including looting and kidnapping.  This, in turn, led Iraqis without tribal 
protection to invent new tribes of their own or to attempt to integrate with an existing 
tribe.162  As state control waned, the role of tribes in mediating and causing chaos was 
complex.  The difficulties Saddam’s security state had with the tribes continued under the 
new management of Iraq. 
The considerable powers attained by tribes near the end of Saddam’s rule 
would not be easily forsaken.  Heavily armed tribes provided a fertile ground for some 
cells of resistance.163  These tribal structures have provided insular organizational 
structures to some resistance members.  One observer warned that Saddam’s policies 
promoting traditional structures “encouraged ethnic and sectarian sub-national tendencies 
that could erupt into violence were a prolonged power struggle to ensue after Saddam’s 
demise.”164  These words, written in 1997, have proven dramatically prescient. 
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2. Islam 
The search for a refuge from Saddam’s terror helped to promote a resurgent Islam 
and “a climate favorable to the emergence of fundamentalist political thinking.”165  The 
resurgent Islam during the last two decades of Saddam’s rule was increasingly sectarian 
in outlook,166 fueling political troubles in transition.  The confluence of regime 
promotion of Islam, a regional context of politicized Islam, and an Iraqi population 
receptive to such messages provided a potent tool for resistance to occupation. 
The involvement of Islamic structures in the resistance does not owe itself wholly 
to peculiarities of Islam, but rather to the position of religious institutions in repressive 
regimes.  When public outlets of political participation are closed, the public often turns 
to religious institutions “to represent and protect its interests.”167  Furthermore, religious 
institutions are often a last bastion of assembly and sanctuary in repressive regimes, 
increasing their popularity.  Sociological path dependency theorists argue that 
“conditions of uncertainty [like those experienced in crisis and transition] typically 
reinforce old networks and patterns as people turn back toward the familiar and the 
safe.”168  Iraqis increasingly turned to religion in the later years of Saddam’s rule and 
after the occupation.  Some found radicalizing influences in the powerful language of 
political Islam.  Many of these Islamic radicals were also early activists in the resistance 
to foreign occupation due to religious motivations.  
Islam became a tool for Saddam’s regime in the 1980s and 90s when a policy of 
re-Islamization was adopted to provide stability in the society and legitimacy to the 
state.169  As confrontation with the West grew, Saddam allowed political rhetoric in the 
sermons of Sunni clerics170 and emphasized the image of a foreign assault on Islam.171  
Despite Saddam’s shallow motivations, politicization of Islam found a receptive audience 
in some circles. 
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Hussein augmented rhetoric with Islamic programs in the 1990s.  The regime 
distributed several million copies of the Koran, accompanied by mandatory religious 
courses,172 and opened new mosques and the Saddam University for Islamic Studies.173  
Huddud punishments, such as amputations, were implemented starting in 1994, along 
with a crackdown on alcohol and prostitution.174   The increased emphasis on an 
authoritarian form of Islam coincided with the population’s rising religiosity. 
Iraqis turned to religion in large numbers in the latter years of Saddam’s rule 
because Islam provided solace from great hardship and mosques provided a venue for 
social interaction in a state permeated by security services.  Attendance at mosques was 
said to have doubled in the five years before the 2003 war.175  Many began to see Iraq’s 
crises in religious terms.176  In the words of one young Iraqi speaking in the summer of 
2002, “We feel we need support, we need peace, so we pray.”177   Additionally, “the 
mosques were the only institution, apart from the tribes, relatively immune to regime and 
party control,” providing a place of assembly for the increasing number of Iraqis not 
interested in the Ba’ath.  As Ba’ath ideology waned, youths turned increasingly to the 
ideology of Islam.178   
Ayyash al-Kubaysi, a representative of Iraq’s Muslim Ulema Council, states that 
the Iraqi mujahideen were “reared in the mosque.  The mosque embraced them.”  “The 
ulema and honest people” secretly educated the youth under the former regime. “The 
fruits of this secret education were seen once the lid was removed” by the 2003 
invasion.179  Iraqi Islamist activity operated in a larger regional context.  Regional 
Islamist influences penetrated Iraq’s borders, defying Saddam’s crackdown on Iraqi 
Islamists.  Outside Iraq, the plight of Iraq’s populations under sanctions was a cause 
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around which regional Islamists mobilized.  Some of these Islamic networks included 
radical mujahideen that would see Iraq as a new cause célèbre. 
Despite regime censorship, Iraqis were not completely isolated from Islamist 
influences coming in from the rest of the region.  Islamist publications and audio tapes 
were smuggled in across porous borders.  These influences did not motivate Iraqis to 
resist Saddam’s government, a campaign almost certain to fail,180 but they were probably 
instrumental in preparing some Iraqis for Islamist resistance to occupation.    Iraqi 
Islamist Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid’s books were among those smuggled in from 
Egypt to a receptive audience.  His readers were introduced to the theories of jihad but 
were warned to wait for the proper time of action.  Similar messages were available in 
smuggled Islamist videos and cassettes.181   
Several themes of regional Sunni Islamism resonated with the situation inside 
Iraq.  Sunni identity and anti-Shi’a violence were “a constituent part” of Sunni Islamic 
militancy across the region.182  This message was well-received by Sunnis facing 
domination by their historical subjects, the Shi’a.  In this context, Sunni militants may see 
the U.S. intervention as “proof of ‘sinister’ U.S. intentions toward Islam,” fueling anti-
American violence as well.183   
Iraq was a focus of regional Islamist activism during the sanctions of the 1990s.  
The impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people was well publicized in the region, 
emphasizing the suffering of fellow Arabs.  The campaign to alleviate Iraqi suffering fit 
in with Islamist themes of “American hegemonic aspirations; double standards; hostility 
to Arabs and Islam; [and] support of Israel.”  Islamist mosques, especially in Jordan, 
were centers of charitable activism for Iraq.184  Such activism provided a venue through 
which regional Islamists were drawn into the Iraqi cause.  It is possible that some radicals  
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activated by this topic were well positioned to make the transition to resistance in 2003.  
Furthermore, Iraqi recipients of Islamist charity were probably more open to regional 
Islamist activism as well.   
Regional Islamists also came to Jordanian towns on the Iraqi border to buy 
inexpensive weapons smuggled by Iraqi cab drivers.  Many weapons ended up in Saudi 
Arabia or Palestine, or were stockpiled in Jordan.185  These transactions likely created a 
network of contacts between Iraqis and Islamist militants in Jordan.  Such contacts may 
have facilitated movement of ideology, funds and Islamist recruits into Iraq after the fall 
of the regime. 
A more narrowly-interpreted regional influence that has shaped the most extreme 
resistance groups is the Salafi movement.  This influential movement follows a strict 
adherence to the Koran and the example of the Prophet Muhammad.  The oneness of God 
(tawhid) is central to their beliefs, as is the rejection of any role for “human reason, logic, 
and desire.”  The resultant interpretation rejects any possibility of Islamic pluralism.  A 
militant segment of this group, the jihadi faction, arose from the war against the Soviets 
in Afghanistan.186  The uncompromising nature of the Salafi beliefs and the militancy of 
the jihadi faction are important to understanding the polar and unyielding nature of the 
most radical Islamist groups in Iraq today.   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The removal of the central point of leadership for the institutions of regime 
security and the patronized societal structures created a number of cells of former regime 
elements, tribal groups, Islamic strongholds, and the like (see Figure 2).  These elements 
were connected through personal and professional ties to allow them to coordinate as a 
loose network.  Without the central power and guidance of the regime, these elements 
were free to pursue their own interests in a very chaotic and fragmented environment.  
Many of them chose to resist the transition imposed by foreign military presence.  In the 
words of Andreas Wimmer, the “sub-national power structure that was hitherto hidden 
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under the centralized military, party, and security apparatus has become visible.”  This 
structure lacks “trans-ethnic networks of civil society organizations” that could provide 
some unifying voice across Iraq.187  Thus, the chaos that ensued was a product of what 
lay underneath Saddam’s central power.  This sub-national power structure was 
undeniably a legacy of Saddam’s active manipulation of state and society, even if all of 
the outcomes were not specifically what Saddam would have desired. 
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III. THE VIOLENT SUNNI REJECTION  
OF TRANSITION IN IRAQ 
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq never faced the fanatical defensive tactics many 
feared.  Pitched fighting occurred in some areas, but the rapid U.S. advance largely 
overwhelmed the Iraqi Army.  Liberation gave way to chaos as police and security 
services disappeared and widespread looting occurred.  In this environment, some 
pockets of motivated Iraqis carried on the fight against the coalition.  Resistance was 
present in April and “it was well underway and serious” by November 2003.188   
What was initially characterized as the die-hard fanaticism of a few “dead-enders” 
was actually a vanguard that was soon followed by others, blossoming into a tenacious 
resistance.  The resistance has proven to be predominately Sunni Iraqi.  The ideologies 
and motivations behind Sunni resistance groups defy polar categorization, but rather form 
a continuum with purely secular calculations, often based on power and economics, on 
one end; and rabid devotion to extremist Islamic positions on the other (see Figure 3).  In 
the middle, many groups contain a mix of parochial political ideologies with Islamic 
rhetoric.  It is not uncommon to find “a mix between Saddamism and Islam” in many 
regions.189   
 
Figure 3.   Resistance Group Motivations. 
 
The mix of motivations for Sunni resistance provides a potent mix of parochial 
and religious ideologies.  This mix has enabled an opportunistic group of violent resisters 
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to collaborate and network through the structures and ties provided by the legacy of 
Saddam’s rule in Sunni society.  In this manner, the violent Sunni rejection of the 
trajectory of transition in Iraq is motivated and enabled by the legacies of totalitarian rule 
in Iraqi society and sub-state power structures. 
Parochial Sunni resisters are driven primarily by concerns of identity, power, and 
nationalism without a commitment to an Islamic state outcome.  These groups have been 
labeled by some as “secular,” but this term is misleading because Islam is important to 
many of these groups.  The potency of religious motivations has fanned the spread of 
resistance from an early FRE vanguard to other groups in Iraq.   
Islamic institutions have been a powerful influence on the resistance.  Most 
resistance groups utilize at least some Islamic rhetoric in their program.  The Islamic 
extremist minority groups lie nearest the religious end of the spectrum, although their 
religious motives and goals are intertwined with politics.  Groups that many define as 
“secular,” such as Iraqi nationalists and Ba’athists, also find motivation, legitimation, and 
solace in Islamic ideologies regarding jihad and the foreign imposition of a new order in 
an Islamic region.  They are also aided by the attributes of some Islamic institutions.  
These groups are all able to harness the power of religion as shaped by the Iraqi and 
regional context prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion. 
Despite the power of religion, radical Islamist militants are estimated to constitute 
only 5 to 15 percent of the resistance.190  Some may attribute the rise of Islamic rhetoric 
and violence to insidious hostility of Islam to the West; however, there are several 
concrete factors stemming from the ideological and organizational advantages of religion, 
as well as Iraqi and regional influences prior to the invasion, that set the stage for the use 
of Islam by both Islamist radicals and Iraqi nationalists in the resulting resistance.   
Once the regime fell, a compelling resistance motivation for Iraqis outside the 
hard core of the regime was couched in terms of religious legitimacy and duty.  Rising 
religiosity in Iraq gave potent ideological and organizational advantages to these resisters.  
Religiosity and religious institutions were resurgent in pre-invasion Iraq for two reasons, 
discussed in Chapter II.  First, Saddam used Islam as a tool of control and legitimation in 
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the latter years of his rule,191 politicizing and increasing the prominence of religion 
within the state.  Second, religion was increasingly attractive to Iraqis facing the hardship 
of wars and sanctions. 192  Regional influences also bear on the resistance.  Regional 
Islamist ideology entered Iraq through porous borders193 and the issue of Iraqi suffering 
due to war and sanctions served as a focal point of regional Islamist mobilization.194  For 
these reasons, Islamic ideology was a pre-existing and potent influence that directly 
shaped an Islamic resistance consisting of an Iraqi majority and an influential, 
transnational jihadi minority.  This Islamic resistance was a significant factor in the 
spread of violence beyond the former regime cadre. 
The trend of rising Iraqi religiosity increased with the chaos of regime collapse.  
“Islamic norms in dress and public decorum” were more prominent195 and religion 
exerted a growing influence amid the upheaval in Iraq.  A Baghdad merchant explained, 
“During the U.S. invasion, I saw so much chaos and death that I turned to God.  Now 
there is so much corruption and violence that we need an Islamic government according 
to sharia.  That would stop a lot of the suffering we have now.”196   
A journalist well-positioned to observe the changes in Iraq saw “the first signs of 
a resurgent religion” amongst Sunnis in summer of 2003, often taking the form of 
“religious absolutism” that helped to provide “direction and meaning” and to demarcate 
“the borders of a community that notions of being Sunni, Arab, and Iraqi could all fall 
within.”197  In post-Saddam Iraq, Islam is a primary venue for “people looking for 
guidance and identity.”198   
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Beyond ideological solace, religious institutions were able to provide stability in 
cities where chaos reigned after the fall of Baghdad.199  The ability of Islamic leaders to 
stem unrest in the aftermath of the invasion in 2003 put Islamic networks in a position of 
power and prestige in Iraq, offering potential resisters powerful advantages in the linkage 
of resistance to religion. 
Religion plays into the larger legacy of Ba’ath rule.  Due to the lack of any cross-
cutting, national ties, the new political structure of Iraq put Sunnis at odds with Shi’a and 
Kurds, creating the perception of a zero-sum game where power gained by the others was 
power lost by the Sunnis.  Moderate Sunnis had little experience in organization and had 
no unified voice to engage in dialogue with the Shi’a and the Kurds, or to deter armed 
resistance.  The groups that had organizational and motivational structures to build on 
(regime structures, tribes, and Islamic institutions) were largely radicalized and 
militarized by the rule of Saddam.  These elements constituted a sub-state power structure 
in pre-invasion Iraq.  This power structure was well-situated to resist its loss of 
prominence in a new Iraq.  The rapid rise of resistance groups owes itself to this legacy of 
Saddam’s rule. 
 
A. SUNNI STRUCTURES AND MOTIVATIONS FOR RESISTANCE 
Sunni elites have a number of concrete reasons for resisting a new order in Iraq. 
One scholar explains, they “lost power, they lost position, they lost influence, and no jobs 
program or provision of electricity can compensate for that.”200   The new order is 
unlikely to provide many Sunnis with the power and autonomy to which they are 
accustomed.  The high personal cost of reform on some Sunni Iraqis provides a basic 
motive for dogged resistance. 
A long “list of revenge-seeking enemies” is created by a minority ruling elite’s 
use of forceful repression.  The prospect of revenge raises the “expected costs of reform” 
to the rulers.201  The Sunni elites realize that the bill for their oppressive rule is coming  
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due.  Individuals complicit in such repression are those faced with the highest costs from 
regime change and also those with the greatest access to the weapons, training, and 
support required to resist occupation. 
Other Sunni Iraqis are accustomed to power and autonomy enjoyed under Sunni 
rule and reject the new order which takes their status away.  Members of the regime and 
its societal support networks see their personal fate tied to the fate of Sunni power in Iraq.  
Regardless of any loyalty to Saddam, these individuals have an interest in the restoration 
of some form of Sunni power.  The high expected costs of reform for many Sunnis have 
led to a willingness to use desperate methods of violent resistance to transition in Iraq. 
Many individuals do not desire a return to Ba’athist rule.  In the words of one 
Baghdadi who hoped for a better outcome, “The thing that really pisses me off- we’ve 
been under sanctions for thirteen years, everything we underwent for thirteen years… For 
nothing.  For nothing.  It was all a big joke.”202  These Sunnis desire an outcome that 
validates their suffering.  They are looking for a best-case result of a new Iraq that retains 
Sunni power and they believe that the coalition is standing in the way of their ambitions.  
Saddam and the former regime were the direct cause of much suffering, yet many Iraqis 
“see the West equally as culpable as Saddam for the misery of the country.”203  
Sunnis have enjoyed supremacy since the formation of Iraq in the wake of World 
War I.204  They held this power at the expense of the Shi’ite majority now empowered by 
a representative system.  The Iraqi patriotism of some Sunni resisters “may be construed 
as self-serving” in that it legitimates their struggle to avoid marginalization,205 but this 
serves to strengthen nationalistic sentiments.  Iraqi nationalism also resonates with a 
long-standing disdain toward foreign, especially non-Muslim, occupation in the Arab 
world,206 and this disdain for the West was promoted by Saddam during his rule.  The 
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confluence of nationalism with self-preservation, self-interest, and rejection of the 
outsider provides a potent and mutually-reinforcing mix of resistance motivations. 
The resistance began as a cadre with the motivation and means to resist, often 
elements of the former regime.  This cadre expanded as events motivated more Sunnis to 
join the resistance.  Some resisters are average Sunnis with little connection to the former 
regime, but military or security training of many Sunnis has been useful to resistance 
groups across the spectrum of ideologies. 
1. Regime Preparation for Resistance 
While much of the resistance grew from concrete motives, there was some regime 
preparation prior to the invasion.  Observers point to the quick emergence of resistance as 
evidence of a prepared “stay-behind operation” to resist occupation.207  U.S. military 
commanders believe that caches of weapons and money that fuel the resistance were pre-
planned as well.  They describe the planning as “a concept of operations” to be 
implemented under decentralized control, rather than a centralized campaign plan.208  
These preparations are not an indication of a regime-centric insurgency campaign, but are 
additional advantages conferred on former regime elements in the resistance.  
Numerous sources indicate that Saddam Hussein planned for former regime 
elements to take part in a guerrilla campaign after the fall of the regime.  According to a 
U.S. military intelligence report, Saddam sent 1,000 to 1,200 officers for two months of 
guerrilla training at Salman Pak and Bismayah in fall of 2002.  These officers were 
selected from several intelligence services and “were told to prepare themselves for 
recontact following the collapse of the regime.”209  A senior officer from the Presidential 
Palace also reportedly ordered the training of a group of 100 Saudis, Afghans, and other 
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foreigners under supervision of senior Fedayeen officers at Al-Nahrawan and Salman 
Pak.  These individuals were subsequently dispersed to fight against U.S. forces.210   
A former Iraqi intelligence operative who became a leader in the Fedayeen in 
Fallujah supported these claims. “We have been preparing for this kind of guerrilla war 
for a long time. We know each other and we have ways of communicating with one 
another.  The Americans made a big mistake by thinking that we all disappeared after the 
war.”  He stated that the network of resistance groups operates in five to six-man cells211 
as directed by a contemporaneous Ba’ath Party memo.212  A resistance leader in Baghdad 
known as “Abu Omar,” reportedly an Iraqi general prior to the occupation, said, “Six 
months before the occupation, we started training and exercising resisting the American 
army in small groups.”213 The power of preparation prior to the fall of the regime 
allowed FREs to organize quickly and use their military skills in a devastating manner 
before any other coherent Sunni voice could assemble.   
Some experts also believe that the regime distributed and cached weapons around 
the country to enable resistance in the wake of regime collapse.214  Resistance members 
have less conspiratorial explanations.  “The Americans… almost gave us the weapons,” 
explains Mohammed, a resistance member from Fallujah.  “They thought we were 
thieves… They thought we were destroying the Iraqi army.”215  In reality, some of the 
looters were stockpiling weapons for resistance.  Tribal groups also stockpiled weapons 
they are now willing to sell to the resistance (for example SA-7 Strelas sell at $325 
each).216  FREs were not the only Iraqis with access to weapons, however.  Iraqis 
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stockpiled guns and ammunition from Baghdad gun stores in the days just before the war.  
Many of these purchases were motivated by the fear of anarchy in the event of regime 
collapse.217    Regardless of how the resistance acquires them, Iraqi sources assert that the 
“huge amounts of weapons” left behind by the regime “are undoubtedly one of the main 
sources for arming” resistance groups.218   
A former Republican Guard officer was an early resister who claims that Saddam 
provided active assistance.  The officer and some of his friends conducted ambushes on 
U.S. convoys in the early days of the occupation.  Two weeks after the collapse of the 
regime, a messenger from Saddam asked the officer what he needed for resistance.  
Saddam provided cash and weapons shortly thereafter, along with the instructions, 
“Widen your network; go around the country and find others who will fight.”  The officer 
has since provided assistance to numerous resistance groups, as well as assisting in the 
establishment of Jaish Mohammed, a FRE resistance group.219  The influence of Saddam 
after regime collapse is not evidence of a centrally commanded and controlled 
insurgency.  Rather, Saddam’s voice provided motivation to some of the many cells of 
Sunni rejectionists.  Regime preparation ensured that a cadre of violent resisters would be 
well-positioned to take up arms in the wake of invasion.  The expansion of resistance past 
this cadre owes itself to a number of motivations.   
2. Motivations for Resistance in the Wake of Saddam’s Fall 
Many Sunni Iraqis were very receptive to narratives that motivated resistance in 
the aftermath of invasion.  The Sunni loss of power, position, and influence were strong 
motives for rejection of transition that were exacerbated by a number of incidents in the 
aftermath of invasion, helping the resistance to take root in many areas. 
Sunnis were heavily reliant on state employment.  Shortly after the 1991 Gulf 
War, a United Nations survey found 822,000 Iraqis employed by the state.  This 
constituted around 21 percent of the work force, making 40 percent of households 
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dependant on government salaries.220  In some Sunni regions, as many as 90 percent 
were members of the Ba’ath party and around 25 percent of workers were employed by 
the government.221  When the regime fell and these government salaries went away, a 
huge sector of Iraqis became instantly unemployed. 
The security services and armed forces, in particular, seemed to melt away after 
the fall of Baghdad.  Some of this was by coalition design, however.  Psychological 
operations prior to the invasion promoted desertion of the armed forces.222  Despite the 
request for Iraqi desertion, the status of the Iraqi armed forces was not addressed by the 
Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid (ORHA) until Iraqi soldiers 
demonstrated for back-pay in front of ORHA headquarters in mid-May 2003.  The 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), in one of its earliest moves on May 23, 2003, 
dissolved the Iraqi armed forces and security services223 leaving 500,000 men with 
military training jobless.224  Troubles with former members of the military continued in 
June when Iraqi soldiers again protested, this time because a promised monthly stipend 
had not been delivered.  In the resulting tensions, two former Iraqi soldiers were killed.  
Efforts of senior regime loyalists to draw unemployed soldiers into the fight against the 
Americans found increasing sympathy as patience wore thin due to broken promises and 
the shooting of two of their number.225  Both a former Iraqi general, now a resistance  
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leader, and U.S. Major General James Marks, head of intelligence for ground forces at 
the time, believe that the decision to disband the Iraqi army was a significant factor in the 
propagation of the resistance.226 
Another motive for resistance, which became a self-fulfilling prophecy, was the 
perception that coalition forces were at “war against the Sunnis themselves.”227  This 
impression was probably created in the early days of the occupation, when “clumsy but 
accidental killings of civilians” by U.S. troops in the Sunni towns of Fallujah, Hit, Tikrit, 
and Samarra led to Sunni ambushes in reprisal.228  This started a cycle of mutually-
reinforcing violence.  As coalition forces seek out resisters in Sunni areas, a by-product is 
the impression that Sunnis are being targeted, creating stronger motives for Sunni 
resistance and reinforcing the cycle of attack and counterattack (see Figure 4).  This cycle 
is exacerbated by the tribal custom of revenge killings.  For these reasons “the cycle, 
once started, was almost impossible to stop.”229  
In one example, a road near the village of some wealthy Sunni farmers provided a 
good ambush site for resistance members to lay in wait for coalition convoys.  Resistance 
cells came from many areas to take advantage of the good terrain in this area.  During an 
ensuing firefight, a U.S. tank round seriously damaged a house in the village.  One 
villager stated, “Before and now we hate Americans.  And then they do this and we hate 
them more.”230  The animosity was already present, but the cycle of violence is fed by 
each attack. 
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Disenfranchisement of Sunni Iraqis can take on a more insidious character as lack 
of respect for Iraqis on the part of some coalition troops creates serious consequences.  
One U.S. soldier in an advisory role with Iraqi security forces summed up his feelings by 
saying, “I don’t build bonds.  I don’t build friendships. I don’t have contacts, with none 
of them.”  In turn, his Iraqi counterpart observed, “We are the police and they don’t 
respect us.  How is it possible for them to respect the Iraqi people?”  This frustrated Iraqi 
officer quit his post.231  A more general complaint of Sunnis is a perception of “cultural 
ignorance and disdain for the Iraqis” on the part of U.S. troops.232  Many Iraqis frustrated 
by lack of respect and lack of equipment and faced with a very dangerous job have given 
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up cooperation with the coalition.  Some of these armed security veterans turn to the 
other side with their valuable knowledge of coalition and Iraqi positions and tactics.233 
Tribal power and norms fuel the resistance and expand its ranks.  Tribes resist the 
dilution of their considerable powers under a new, centralized government in Iraq.  Some 
tribes also resent the impact of coalition border policing on their lucrative smuggling 
endeavors.234  Norms of revenge may be the most damaging aspect of tribes in Iraq.  The 
killing of tribal members necessitates revenge or the payment of “blood money.”235  This 
practice, emphasized in the later years of Saddam’s rule, may have a role in escalating the 
violence in some regions as tribal militias seek revenge by attacking coalition troops, 
drawing further military attention to the area. 
Tribal structures also provide an enforcing mechanism against collaboration and a 
social support network for resisters.  Informants sometimes cause conflict between tribes 
when their collaboration results in the death of a tribe member.  In one such case, the 
threat of tribal vendetta led to the execution of the informer.  The execution was carried 
out not by masked insurgents, but by the informant’s father and brother because the threat 
of further bloodshed necessitated the man’s death.236  Similarly, concepts of tribal and 
village solidarity cast local Iraqi police working with coalition troops as traitors to their 
own town.237  Finally, tribal allegiances cut across the various resistance ideologies,238 
providing channels for networking and coordination between many groups that have 
“strong tribal affiliations or cells.”239  Tribal powers cultivated in the later years of 
Saddam’s rule and have proven to be potent obstacles to a new order in Iraq. 
As instability in Iraq drags on, the themes of disempowerment, unemployment, 
Sunni identity, and family ties are reinforced as resistance motivations.  The confluence 
of motivations for Sunni resistance is well expressed by General Mohamed Abdullah 
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Shahwani, the Iraqi national intelligence chief.  "People are fed up after two years, 
without improvement. People are fed up with no security, no electricity, people feel they 
have to do something. The army was hundreds of thousands. You'd expect some veterans 
would join with their relatives, each one has sons and brothers." 240 
The non-Islamist Sunni resistance is generally fighting to reject Shi’a dominance 
and Sunni marginalization.  Some desire a return to a Ba’ath-like state, while others 
simply want what they deem to be a “fair share” of power in the new Iraq.241  The return 
to Sunni dominance in Iraq is at best a far-flung hope, but it is increasingly clear that the 
only possible path to that goal is violence.  Only the realization that the era of Sunni 
supremacy is gone will induce some resisters to seek political accommodation along 
more reasonable lines.242  The mix of religious motivations with these parochial issues 
further embeds resistance in Sunni society. 
3. The Power of Religion 
Islam is a powerful influence on both parochial and Islamic extremist resisters.  
Religion confers two powerful advantages to the resistance.  First, religion can provide a 
latent motivating and legitimating framework for resistance activity.  Islamic activists in 
cases outside Iraq have been able to successfully mobilize participation in high-risk 
activism by framing their actions as religious duty,243 and this mechanism can be found 
in Iraq as well.   
Second, the institutions surrounding religious activity can provide latent 
organizational structures to new movements.  These structures include trained leadership, 
financial networks, fertile recruitment networks, communications channels, shared 
identity, political legitimacy, and “open space” in civil society.244  These factors are 
salient in the organization of Iraqi resistance. 
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Religion can be seen as a type of “cultural meaning-system” that is “rooted in 
realities that are believed to exist above and beyond the temporal, mundane, material 
world.”245  This “sacred transcendence” yields an unparalleled motivational tool.  The 
alignment of a movement’s cause with God’s will or eternal truth can sustain “activism in 
the face of great adversity”246  and provide “an expanded sense of the possible.”247  
Ayyash al-Kubaysi, a representative of Iraq’s Muslim Ulema Council, demonstrates the 
logic that provides solace to resisters in Iraq. “God is greater than the United States.  God 
is with us.  We are therefore stronger than the United States.”248  The expanded sense of 
the possible is one factor that aids resisters to rationalize their high-risk activities. 
When activists engage in military resistance or other high-risk activism, a robust 
motivation system is required.249  Religious movements have been able to overcome this 
problem by couching activism in non-negotiable terms of “divine compulsion.”250  For 
example, Islamic activists in Egypt have been able to successfully mobilize participation 
by framing high-risk actions as religious duty.251  Similar mechanisms are evident in the 
resistance in Iraq. 
Numerous clerics have invoked the concept of duty in promoting jihad against 
U.S. forces.  Respected leaders provide legitimacy to the resistance groups’ actions and 
recruiting efforts.  Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi, Sheikh of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, 
stated in a Friday sermon that the U.S. invasion was against Islamic law, making jihad an 
“obligation for every Muslim.”252  Similar statements have been made by other 
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influential figures such as Dr. Ahmad Yusuf Sulaiman, a professor of Islamic law,253 and 
Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi, an influential Islamist in Dubai.254   
These Islamic leaders frame jihad as an individual duty (fard ’ayn) required of all 
Muslims.  Traditionally, jihad has been considered a collective duty (fard kifaya), 
meaning that the group under threat must take up jihad but as long as sufficient numbers 
are mustered, jihad is not required of every Muslim.255   Thus, some Islamic leaders 
undertake a sort of innovation (bid’a)256 that creates a frame for mobilization of 
resistance.   
Interviews of captured resisters suggest that these statements of duty carry a 
powerful influence.  Mujahideen from Saudi Arabia257 and Iraq258 mention fatwa as 
major influences in their recruitment and in legitimizing their activities.  Others follow 
the preaching of regional radicals and local imams requiring jihad.259  The statements of 
Islamic resistance leaders, such as Zarqawi, are also laden with references to the “right 
path” and “missions of da’wa”260 that can be seen as religious duty. 
Religion is critical in providing an impetus for self-sacrifice.  Willingness to 
sacrifice oneself for a higher cause is important in creating “a critical mass of participants 
early on, even when the cause is idealistic, unrewarding, and unpromising.”261  Religion 
provides the motivation to lead the charge by framing actions as duty, by expanding the 
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notion of what is possible, and by emphasizing the idea of self-sacrifice for the highest 
cause: that of God.  For some radicals, jihad becomes a sacred ritual that is an end in 
itself.  Seeing the religious act of jihad as sacred in and of itself may be one factor in 
rationalizing missions of self-sacrifice.262   
Martyrdom can also serve as an example to motivate others, as evidenced by the 
statement of one group.263  The concepts surrounding martyrdom in Islam also help to 
motivate and rationalize high-risk activity by transforming the grim reality of death.  A 
resister described the bodies of martyrs (shaheed) in idyllic terms.  “When they become 
shaheed, it is a beautiful smell and their color stays fresh.  And friends see this and they 
want to die.”264  These ideological messages are conveyed through religious 
organizational structures that are a second major advantage for religious resistance. 
Religious institutions provide numerous organizational advantages that have been 
important to the Iraqi resistance.  Provision of trained leaders265 and organizational space 
for new movements is especially important in regimes where religious space may be the 
last bastion of society that is not thoroughly controlled by the government.266  In Iraq, 
mosques were the only space not fully controlled by the various security organs.267  
Religious leaders were increasingly important in the society as well,268 due to their 
prominent social position and their distance from corruption that surrounded the 
regime.269    
Religious institutions provide “ready-made opportunities for network- and bloc-
recruitment” of new members.270  Ideology predisposes individuals for high-risk 
activism, and sustains their involvement in such activities.  A prior history of lower-level 
activism and “integration into supportive networks” pull the potential recruit toward 
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“mak[ing] good on … strongly held beliefs.”271  Gradual recruitment to high-risk forms 
of activism often requires previous involvement in lower-risk activity.272  Involvement of 
individuals in religious activity and integration into networks of similarly-minded 
individuals provide a powerful venue for recruitment. 
Mosques have provided recruiting venues for regional Islamists273 as well as 
Iraqis.274  The mosque is a venue where potential resisters can talk to like-minded 
Muslims and sometimes join in a bloc.  The scattered nature of recruitment through 
prolific Islamic venues defies state security efforts and is not isolated to one state in the 
region. 
The account of a young French citizen who was inducted into Islamic activism is 
particularly instructive.  After an injury disqualified Peter Cherif from his dream of 
serving in the French Marines, he was drawn into the Rue de Tanger mosque.  Cherif 
gradually became more radical in his beliefs and went to Damascus to study.  Cherif’s 
mother could sense that he was slipping into a more tightly-controlled environment 
before she lost contact with her son in July 2004.  Several months later in December, 
Cherif was detained as a resister in Fallujah.275  This example shows the power of 
religious networks to pull motivated individuals into high-risk activity, even across 
significant international distances. 
The example of Peter Cherif also demonstrates how religion provides a shared 
identity that eases mobilization. Religion provides common ground that allows strangers 
to “work together with relative ease in common purpose” and provides a framework that 
“can greatly expedite the process of coming to a shared ‘definition of the situation.’” 
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Religion also provides a basis for transnational cooperation between “otherwise quite 
different groups of people.” 276   Iraqis, Saudis, even European citizens, can interoperate 
under the shared context of Islam. 
Mosques also provide a funding conduit for resistance.  Donations through 
mosques have been implicated in resistance financing.  Mosques also play a role in 
funneling money from outside Iraq into the hands of resisters.277  The existing role of 
mosques in alms-giving and other charitable networks provides resisters with access to 
local and external funding channels. 
One mosque in Iraq that appears to figure prominently in the Salafi resistance is 
the Ibn Taymiyah Mosque in Baghdad.278  Prior to the invasion, the former Umm-al-
Tubul Mosque279 and a popular cleric, Madhi al-Soumaydai, built up a following of 
clandestine Wahhabi extremists who would become active members of the resistance.280  
Captured resisters have implicated al-Soumaydai in paying for the kidnapping and killing 
of foreigners in Baghdad,281 demonstrating the complex position of Islamic leaders and 
networks in the resistance 
Together, these advantages of religious ideology and organization provide a 
powerful mechanism for resistance.  Saddam’s politicization of religious structures for 
his own legitimation, the rising religiosity of Iraqis in the face of great hardship, and the 
regional context of Islamism discussed in Chapter II shaped Islamic institutions in Iraq to 
a great extent.  The Islamic structures in Iraq provided ideologies, organizational 
structures, and individuals well-prepared to capitalize on the power of religion to resist 
the new order in Iraq.  
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B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESISTANCE 
The resistance that rose out of this background was flexible and opportunistic.  
Resisters create “alliances of convenience and informal networks with other groups to 
attack” the coalition and the Iraqi government.  “Movements ‘franchise’ to create 
individual cells and independent units, creating diverse mixes of enemies that are difficult 
to attack.” 282  Many groups consist of small cells of 2-3 men, while others are dispersed 
formations that can combine in groups as large as 30-50 for specific operations.283  
Criminals can also be exploited to make attacks on infrastructure and to provide funds for 
the resistance.284   
1. Insurgency or Resistance? 
It is important to address the question of how the violence in Iraq should be 
labeled.  The CIA Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency defines insurgency as  
a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or 
partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular 
military forces and illegal political organizations…  The common 
denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular 
area.  This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist 
organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an 
alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country.285   
Metz adds that insurgency is designed to allow a militarily weak group to attain a 
political goal.286  Under these definitions, an insurgency is a singular actor that aims to 
control territory and set up an alternate administration or government.   
Examples of classic insurgencies are the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, the Front 
de Liberation Nationale in Algeria, and Mao’s Communist guerrilla forces.  In all of 
these cases, a central leadership provided direction to subordinate units or cells.  When 
this leadership broke down due to targeting, a unifying ideology and a singular political  
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goal acted as a framework for insurgent action.  Where factions acted alone or engaged in 
internal power struggles, the desired end state of the insurgents did not differ significantly 
from one group to the next. 
In contrast to these classic insurgencies, the resistance in Iraq consists of a web of 
groups with different and often mutually exclusive goals; therefore any grand strategy 
aimed at countering an insurgency is likely to fail.  Furthermore, the resistance in Iraq 
has not yet yielded a central figure or group with the power, ideological program, and 
goal of establishing administrative structures.  In contrast to classic insurgent forces such 
as the North Vietnamese-supported Viet Cong, the Iraqi resistance consists of “small, 
scattered, disparate groups” without “an explicit set of war aims.”287  The only common 
aim of the resistance is rejection of the occupying force and their Iraqi collaborators. 
2. Hierarchies, Networks, and Netwar 
The lack of a central leadership authority makes concerted action difficult, but 
also provides an adaptive and survivable structure.  The resistance in Iraq is a network of 
cells.  Networked cells have been a common feature of many insurgencies, but the 
network in Iraq has proven capable of bringing disparate actors together to collaborate on 
operations despite severe ideological differences.  This collaboration can best be 
explained through the concepts of networks and netwar. 
A horizontal network is a structure of multiple cells that are roughly equal in 
power.  These cells are connected by various channels to create a network.  This concept 
can best be understood in contrast to a traditional hierarchical structure, in which 
structures are linked in a clear chain of superior-subordinate power relationships.  A 
traditional hierarchical adversary has clearly defined nodes of leadership and control.  
The removal of such nodes breaks the structure of a hierarchical organization.  This 
removes the unity of purpose of the adversary and fragments the unit into smaller, 
isolated cells which can be targeted.   
In a networked structure, the removal of any leader or node may create a hole in 
the web, but it does not significantly degrade the network due to the multiple power 
centers and means of contact between the nodes.  The only way to combat the network as 
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a whole is to find and remove common sources of support or coordination, or to find 
ways of cleaving large numbers of nodes from the network.  Network actors are difficult 
to combat. 
The concept of netwar has been developed by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, who posit 
that non-state actors can easily “organize into sprawling multiorganizational networks” 
consisting of “of dispersed small groups who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their 
campaigns in an internetted manner, without a precise central command.”  The strength 
of this mode of organization is its flexibility and survivability, yet it may not be able to 
coordinate operations over time if the nodes do not share a common ideology or goal.288  
Hoffman has asserted that the resistance in Iraq is possibly the best case to date for the 
concept of netwar.289   
The lack of a hierarchical command and control mechanism in such networks may 
provide for a “leaderless nexus” between disparate cells.  In terrorist and criminal 
networks, lower-level cell leaders have fewer reservations about opportunistic 
cooperation between formerly “off-limits” entities.  While a high-level leader may 
prohibit some activities as harmful to the long-term goals of the organization, lower-level 
leaders are more likely to focus on short-term cooperation to accomplish their goals.  For 
example, without a Don Corleone, there is no one to tell Mafiosi cells not to cooperate 
with drug dealers to make short-term profit.290  In Iraq, networked cells are able to 
combine opportunistically despite long-term ideological differences.  In some cases, 
criminal cells and resistance cells are also able to cooperate.   
The resistance in Iraq is made up of numerous cells of varying size, largely 
lacking any central leadership or hierarchical structure.  These “leaderless” cells are free 
to craft their campaign and ideology from the various themes discussed above.  The 
nexus between these cells is a willingness to collaborate despite these varied campaigns 
and ideologies.  The major arms of the resistance are parochial and Islamist, but the 
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distinctions between these arms are blurred.  Examination of each of these arms will 
provide insight into their background, characteristics, and strengths. 
 
C. THE PAROCHIAL SUNNI RESISTANCE 
A U.S. military estimate of the resistance in the fall of 2004 pinned its strength at 
11,000 to 20,000 members.  Of this number, 2,200 to 3,300 are “hard core” FREs, with 
another 6,100 to 10,200 “part time” supporters. 291  Former regime elements and their 
parochial supporters are undoubtedly the most significant portion of the resistance 
numerically.   
Numbers point to the weight of former regime elements, but training, financing, 
and other support also plays a significant factor in the perpetuation of the resistance.  A 
Defense Intelligence Agency report from late 2003 acknowledges that “FREs’ prewar 
operating and support structure, access to resources, and training and capabilities make 
them the greatest threat of all anti-coalition groups in the near term.”292  These attributes 
include access to rockets, mortars, and man-portable surface-to-air missiles.293  Former 
regime members also have precise knowledge regarding infrastructure that is critical to 
pinpoint attacks against targets such as Baghdad’s oil supply lines, where the portions of 
infrastructure targeted are those that are most difficult to repair.294  Unemployment left 
Iraqis with such skills ripe for recruitment into the resistance by regime loyalists.   
Key elements of the Ba’ath Party escaped to Syria, but still wield significant 
influence.  Some analysts believe that a key Saddam aide, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, along 
with four others, held a meeting in a car in Baghdad in May 2003 where they decided to 
support the resistance.295  Al-Duri was former vice president and member of the 
Revolutionary Command Council, as well as commander of the Ba’ath Party Regional 
Command under the Hussein regime.  He is number 6 on the coalition’s list of 55 most 
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wanted men in Iraq.296 Al-Duri’s name has been associated with resistance financing and 
direction from Syria since that meeting.  General George W. Casey, the U.S. commander 
in Iraq, stated that these former Ba’athists, now the New Regional Command, operate 
“out of Syria with impunity… providing direction and financing for the insurgency.”297  
The Ba’ath Party also regained strength as a result of a summit held in Al Hasaka, Syria 
in spring of 2004 where those had been tainted by contact with the coalition or the Iraqi 
Governing Council were purged.  After this reorganization, Ba’ath activity resurged.298   
Ba’ath Party meetings have quietly returned to numerous Iraqi cities.  Mid-level 
FRE officials chair meetings aimed at collecting funds for the resistance.  There is a 
disturbing trend of current governmental employees frequenting such meetings as part of 
an effort to infiltrate the new government.  After the exodus of higher level FRE officials 
to Jordan and Syria, more anonymous mid-level officials are now returning to enact the 
plan. 299 
General Mohamed Abdullah Shahwani, the Iraqi national intelligence chief, 
believes the resurgent Ba’ath Party is a key factor in the strength of the resistance.  Key 
Ba’ath officials including Saddam's half-brother Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hassan and former 
aide Mohamed Yunis al-Ahmed are thought to be financiers of resistance, operating 
through connections to former military officials in Mosul, Samarra, Baquba, Kirkuk and 
Tikrit. Shahwani also implicates al-Duri in resistance coordination and funding.300 
A captured resistance cell leader provided another, similar account of the 
leadership of the Ba’ath Party.  He states that ‘Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri is the current leader 
of the party, with Fadhi Al-Mashhadani responsible for the local organizations within 
Iraq and Muhammad Yunis Al-Ahmad, currently in Syria organizing efforts outside of 
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Iraq.301  A December 2003 raid on a Samarra safe house associated with al-Duri netted 
$1.94 million in cash.  Ahmad and Duri reportedly provided funding and instructions to 
fedayeen and FREs in the Mosul area shortly after the invasion.302  The other men 
mentioned have also been tapped for arrest by the office of the Iraqi Prime Minister as of 
March 2005.  Other wanted Ba’athists include Rashid Ta’an Kazim, Aham Hasan Kaka 
al-Ubaydi (now associated with the jihadi group Ansar al-Sunnah), and Abd al-Baqi Abd 
al-Karim al-Abdallah al-Sa’adun (formerly Diyala Region Central Ba’ath Party Regional 
Chairman).303  These officials are drawn from the various power centers of pre-invasion 
Iraq and represent one means for networking the vast number of unemployed former 
regime elements and the numerous resistance groups they belong to. 
Accounting for the different Sunni groups taking part in the resistance is difficult.  
As many as 35 different Sunni Iraqi groups have made public announcements.304  An 
analysis from the Baghdad weekly Al-Zawra states that many of the cells “do not know 
their leadership, the sources of their financing, or who provides them with weapons.”  
This report lists three main Sunni resistance groups:  the 1920 Revolution Brigades, The 
National Front for the Liberation of Iraq, and The Iraqi Resistance Islamic Front.305  A 
U.S. government report lists the Islamic Army of Iraq, Muhammad’s Army, the Secret 
Republican Army, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and the Iraqi Resistance Islamic 
Front.306  It is difficult to assess the true nature of these groups. 
Several groups appear to have large FRE contingents.  Of these groups, the Army 
of Muhammad has garnered the most press.  Colonel Muayed Yassin ‘Aziz ‘Abd Al-
Razaq Al-Nasseri confessed to being commander of this group and noted that it was 
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“founded by Saddam Hussein after the fall of the regime on April 9, 2003.”307  U.S. 
intelligence reports corroborate that Saddam created this group, along with other 
resistance organizations308 and another account has a resistance leader in possession of 
leaflets from the Army of Muhammad on July 9, 2003.309  The Army of Muhammad, 
according to Nasseri, has 800 fighters and has collaborated with the Ba’ath Party since 
April of 2004.  He reports that the leaders of the Army have been Yasser Al-Shab’awi 
(captured in July 2003), Sa’d Hammad Hisham until December 2003, then Nasseri.  
Nasseri described the group as “a military armed one, which operated according to a 
principle of non-centralized command.”  The networked nature of support for resistance 
groups is evidenced by connections including the Ba’ath Party, the Syrian Ba’ath Party, 
and Fawzi al-Rawi, a financier that also has connections to other resistance factions.310 
Other reports corroborate that the Army of Muhammad is “a Ba’athist group 
composed of former intelligence, security, and police officers in Saddam’s regime.”  The 
group “uses cash bonuses” and even goes as far as providing health and death benefits to 
attract fighters.  These reports point to Sayf al-Din Fulayyih Hasan [al-Rawi] as the 
leader of the Army of Muhammad.311  Hasan was chief of staff of the Republican Guard 
and remains at large as number 14 on the coalition’s most wanted list.312 
Some officials see the resistance beginning to organize regionally, with 
coordination between regions, but no national organization as of yet.313  Connections 
between parochial Sunni and Islamist groups are also tentative.  Many of the connections 
between groups appear to exist in the area of financing and some joint attacks and 
statements. 
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D. ISLAMIC ASPECTS OF SUNNI RESISTANCE  
Islamic structures were left in a prominent position by the fall of the regime.  
Politicized and increasingly important Islamic clerics were the most influential Iraqi 
leaders left in many areas after the regime fell.  Iraqis turning to religion to make sense of 
the chaos were attuned to Islamic ideology and organization as the resistance began to 
form.  Religion also fit the Iraqi struggle into a regional context.   These factors yield a 
resistance that is able to fit a wide range of motivations and goals into a context of 
Islamic legitimacy and duty. 
Radical Islamist groups present a small but virulent facet of the resistance,314 with 
potential access to transnational Islamist networks, and the ability to motivate foreign 
mujahideen through religious images.  On the other hand, even groups with a more 
secular ideology are able to harness the power of Islam.  Former regime elements, 
Ba’athists, and Iraqi nationalists can find Islamic ideology and organizational assistance 
very attractive.  The power of religion operates for these groups, as well; to frame their 
actions as duty, to legitimate their fight, to provide an expanded notion of the possible, 
and to provide solace for impending martyrs and their companions.   
1. Radical Islamist Resistance Groups 
Radical Salafi groups are a minority contributor to the violence in Iraq, but have 
made a “disproportionate impact” due to “the strategic and symbolic nature of their 
attacks, combined with effective Information Operations.”315  These important actors 
constitute one pole of the Islamic aspect of Iraqi resistance. 
Foreign fighters appear to be most prevalent in the Islamic resistance groups, 
owing to the power of Islamist networks and the call to jihad, but the size of this element 
should not be overstated.  For example, the swell of Arab support for the Afghan jihad is 
legendary, but the Arab contribution in terms of combatants was quite small.  Milton 
Bearden, CIA station chief in Pakistan during the 1980s, states that up to 25,000 Arabs 
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passed through Pakistan and Afghanistan over the ten years of the war.316  In contrast, 
between 150,000 and 250,000 Afghan mujahideen were active at a given time.  Some 
sources assert that a total of only a few hundred Arabs engaged in combat operations.  
The vast majority of Arab support was in the form of finance, organization, and other 
support activities, largely in Pakistan.317  Similarly, the bulk of the resisters in Iraq are 
Iraqis. 
Foreign fighters are estimated to constitute 4 to 15 percent of combatants in Iraq.  
The foreigners create effects disproportionate to their number because they use tactics of 
extreme violence calculated to provoke civil war in Iraq.318  American military sources 
state that foreigners constitute 90% of suicide bombers in Iraq.319  One Iraqi handler of 
suicide bombers explains, “Iraqis are fighting for their country’s future, so they have 
something to live for” while foreign volunteers “come a long way from their countries… 
They don’t want to gradually earn their entry to paradise by participating in operations 
against the Americans.  They want martyrdom immediately.”320  
The foreign element may be growing in Iraq, but it is still small.  Between April 
and October 2005, 312 foreign fighters were captured in Iraq.  The fighters came from 
27, mostly Arab, countries.  Seventy-eight of the fighters were Egyptian, 66 Syrian, 41 
Sudanese, and 32 Saudi.  The foreign fighters also included an American, two Britons, 
and an Israeli, all of Arab descent.321  These foreign fighters are unable to operate in Iraq 
without Iraqi support.  Outsiders (even Arabs) stand out to native Iraqis and “can only be 
successful if [they] are provided with resources, protection, concealment, and the 
necessary means to undertake their missions.”322  This point is made clear by the 
complaints of Abu Anas al-Shami, a lieutenant of Zarqawi.  “After one year of jihad… 
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none of us could find a piece of land to use as a shelter or a place to retire to safety 
amongst some members of [his] group… We would hide at day light and sneak like a cat 
at night.”323  These foreigners were ultimately able to find Iraqis conditioned by the 
regional Islamic context and willing to harbor them in Fallujah. 
Umar Husayn Hadid was an active Iraqi Salafi in Fallujah well prior to the 
invasion.  Forced to flee a death sentence from the Ba’ath regime, he resurfaced after the 
invasion to organize a militia in Fallujah.  As a native of the city, Hadid helped to shield 
Zarqawi from ejection or betrayal by the people of Fallujah for the $25 million bounty on 
his head.324  Mujahideen commanders in Fallujah were each linked to a mosque in the 
city,325 demonstrating the power of religious institutions for the resistance.  The regional 
Salafi influence and the power of local religious organizations laid the groundwork for 
the brutal rule of the Islamic Republic of Fallujah.   
Regional Islamists found other parts of Iraq attractive as well.  Many gained entry 
to the Iraqi resistance through the autonomous Kurdish north, a significant outpost for 
Islamists in Iraq prior to 2003.  In the 1990s, two new Islamist groups, Kurdish HAMAS 
and Tawhid, were set up by former Afghan mujahideen.    These groups’ Salafi ideology 
reached Kurdistan through returning mujahideen and Saudi funding.  In September 2001, 
the groups united as Jund al-Islam and soon came under the control of Najmeddin Faraj 
Ahmad (Mullah Krekar) as Ansar al-Islam (AI).326   
Ansar-controlled territories around Hallabja were a stronghold where Kurdish 
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inhabited the training camps of Afghanistan.  They fled to Kurdistan after the U.S. assault 
on their camps and turned to training AI members.  One of these Arab Afghans is thought 
to have been Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.327 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has been a major Islamist leader in Iraq.328  A Jordanian 
Palestinian, Zarqawi formally established his resistance group in April 2004, but was 
active well prior to this date.  His group is currently known as Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi 
Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR).  Early major attacks attributed to Zarqawi’s followers include 
the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad and the catastrophic attack on the 
U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad, both in August 2003.329   
Zarqawi’s background is emblematic of regional extremism.  Zarqawi was born in 
1966 as Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalayla in a poor section of Al-Zarqaa, Jordan.  As 
part of a transition from “extreme depravity to extreme Islamism,” he traveled to 
Afghanistan in 1989, arriving too late to take part in the jihad.  Zarqawi, along with 
several other mujahideen, then returned to agitate a Salafi movement in al-Zarqaa.330  
Zarqawi was jailed in the Jordanian Al-Sawwaqa prison from 1994 to 1999, where his 
life as a street tough helped him gain a sizable following.  Upon his release, Zarqawi led 
many of his followers to Peshawar, Pakistan and on to a camp in Herat, Afghanistan331 
where he was reportedly wounded in 2002.  He escaped through Iran to Iraq and was 
harbored by AI. 332   
Shortly after the occupation in 2003, Zarqawi split from AI to create al-Tawhid 
wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad), a rabidly anti-Shi’a and anti-American group.  In 
October 2004, Zarqawi pledged his allegiance to Osama bin Laden and his group was 
renamed Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidyin (The al-Qaeda Jihad Organization 
in the Land of the Two Rivers, QJBR).  Association with bin Laden elevates Zarqawi’s 
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status vis-à-vis other resistance leaders in Iraq.  The association also gives Zarqawi wider 
access to funding, recruits, and support, both regionally and world-wide.333  More 
recently, Zarqawi has proven able to harness the power of religion to draw former 
military and security members into his group.334  This may be an initial move in a deeper 
struggle between resistance groups to gain dominant religious legitimacy. 
Ansar al-Sunnah (AS) is another key Islamic resistance organization.  Originating 
from Ansar al-Islam (AI), AS appears to be a significant factor in northern Iraq.  The 
group’s establishment was announced in September 2003 and appears to be a 
combination of Kurdish mujahideen from AI with Iraqi Sunni Islamists.335  The U.S. 
Department of State has linked AS to support from both Al-Qaeda and Zarqawi’s cell, 
and thus to an international support network throughout Europe and most of the world.336 
These groups present one pole of the resistance in Iraq.  These examples 
demonstrate how ideology and organization of the radical Islamist resistance is a product 
of Iraqi and regional influences.  The extreme Salafi nature of these groups is not shared 
by all resisters within Iraq, but other groups are able to capitalize on the power of Islam 
as well. 
2. Use of Islam by Other Resistance Elements and “Secular”-Islamist 
Connections 
Islamic concepts regarding resistance found resonance outside the extreme world 
of those like Zarqawi.  A blend of nationalism and Islamism has fueled a portion of the 
Sunni resistance,337 partially owing to Saddam’s reintroduction of politicized Islam as 
one of his strategies of control.  In the Sunni areas of Iraq, “Islam served to unify and 
motivate a disparate array of factions and currents” into “a hybrid of religion and 
nationalism.”338   
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The fusion of Islam and Iraqi nationalism can be found in many of the more 
“secular” groups.  It also serves as a motivation for small cells of disaffected Iraqi 
Sunnis.  These cells are neither radical Salafis, nor former regime supporters.  For “the 
most disenchanted and disillusioned Sunnis in Iraq,” the “simplicity of a struggle against 
the infidels, the veneration of death in sacred battle, and the empowerment that violence 
sometimes provides”339 is a direct result of the power of religion. 
Disaffected Iraqi Sunnis were among the most receptive audiences of clerics’ 
calls for jihad against the American occupation, readily available in local sermons and 
recordings of radical preachers from Syria and other states in the region.  One cell of 
relatively poor Sunnis from Khaldiya united under this Islamic motivation.  Congregating 
in a local mosque, these five men were neither former regime elements, nor well-
organized Islamists.  They organized a small attack on a U.S. convoy that was certain to 
result in their death.  They left behind a message:  “We call on you to join the jihad… not 
to stay still in silence in the face of this oppression and anarchy…  We urge you to be 
joyful with us, we the ones who sacrificed ourselves for the sake of righteousness and 
Islam.”340 
Small cells of Iraqis motivated by religious and nationalist sentiments may be 
seen as a middle ground between well-organized radical Islamist groups on one hand, and 
former regime elements on the other.  They are not fighting in Iraq as part of a regional 
struggle, nor are they trying to reestablish the Ba’ath regime.  They are motivated by a 
deep-rooted perception of the U.S. and a combination of religious and nationalist 
sentiments.  A leaflet handed out at a Sunni mosque in late 2003 provides an example.  
“The goal of the infidels, after stealing our wealth, is to remove us from our religion by 
force and all other means, so that we become a lost nation without principle, making it 
easier for the Jews and Christians to humiliate us.”341  In this case, the motivation is not a 
program for the installation of an Islamic state, but the defense of nation and religion. 
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These themes resonate strongly in tribal areas.  One observer called the resistance 
in Fallujah “a tribal uprising, controlled by religious leaders.”342  Mohammed, a resister 
in the Sunni Triangle, explained that his motivations for involvement were a mix of 
revenge for civilian deaths caused by coalition troops, religious duty, and the fear of 
Shi’a hegemony and reprisals for the abuses of Sunni rule.  They had nothing to do with 
Saddam.  “The world must know that this is an honorable resistance and has nothing to 
do with the old regime,” he stated.  “We take our power from our history, not from one 
person.”343  Although the Sunni tradesmen and professionals of Mohammed’s group had 
no prior links and no loyalty to Saddam’s regime, their resistance had been enabled by 
the legacy of Saddam’s large security complex.  Former Iraqi army officers provided the 
training for Mohammed’s cell.344 
Motivations for former regime elements to join Islamically-motivated groups are 
difficult to categorize.  Former members of the military and security services were 
reported to be joining the ranks of Sunni Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Patriotic Front of Ahmad Kubaisi.  Motivations for this move could be resistance 
to change, an attempt to influence the Islamist organizations, or an attempt to counter 
Shi’a organizations.345  Some former regime members may be motivated by the 
combination of religion and nationalism as well.  These trained individuals can be 
especially influential as leaders and instructors for cells of resisters who have heeded the 
call to jihad, but have no advanced military training.346   
Former regime members may also be turning to religion due to their prolonged 
struggle against the coalition.  One former rocket specialist of the Fedayeen stated in fall 
2003 that he was hoping for a return of the Ba’ath regime.  By summer 2004 he was 
fighting for an Islamic state. 347   
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Religiosity may also be catalyzed by stints in coalition prisons in Iraq.  According 
to interviews of resistance fighters, prisons like Abu Ghraib are venues where Islamic 
extremists meet and educate former regime resistance members.  One former Iraqi 
military officer detained at Abu Ghraib relates, “We studied hard every day and often 
into the night” under the tutelage of Salafi detainees in cellblock “mini-madrasahs.”348  A 
former Republican Guard officer, “Abu Qaqa al-Tamimi,” was arrested for resistance 
activities in November 2003.  After his nine-month detention, a more religious al-Tamimi 
emerged and eventually became a handler of suicide bombers for several resistance 
groups including both Iraqi nationalists and Islamic extremists.349  The role of detention 
centers in indoctrination of resisters is not new.  For example, Israeli prisons played a 
role in the education and mixing of Palestinian fighters during the Intifada. 350  The 
release of “hundreds of detainees” in Iraq in the summer of 2004351 may have similarly 
contributed to increased interoperability of resistance groups.  Furthermore, Iraqi resisters 
are now more likely to cooperate with foreign extremists.  In one instance, the Battalions 
of Islamic Holy War (Kata’ib al-Jihad al-Islamiyah), a FRE group, has become a part of 
the Zarqawi network.  In turn, the Battalion has incorporated foreign fighters into its 
cells.352  These incidents demonstrate the power of religion in blurring lines between 
groups. 
Mowaffak Rubaie, Iraq’s national security advisor, elucidates this power.  
“There’s a tendency to religion-ize the insurgency.  Religion is a strong motive.  You’re 
not going to find someone who’s going to die for the Baathists.  But Salafists have a very 
strong message.  If you use the Koran selectively, it could be a weapon of mass 
destruction.”353 
The blurred lines between the various groups of the resistance are further 
complicated by the various nexus that connect groups.  The connection between cells and 
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the existence of an economic and social support structure for Iraqi resistance cells are the 
greatest strengths of this opportunistic and resilient network.  These connections and 
shared support mechanisms may also be key vulnerabilities for the Iraqi resistance. 
83 
IV. THE NEXUS BETWEEN GROUPS:   
FROM NETWORK TO DEAD-END? 
The case of the Iraqi resistance is characterized by a linkage to legacies of 
Saddam Hussein’s rule.  The legacies of Ba’ath dominance over Iraq were a Sunni sub-
state power structure, including religious and tribal elements, and a set of Sunni 
motivations to resist the trajectory of transition.  These legacies provide fighters, 
structures, and support that serves to perpetuate the resistance despite intense coalition 
targeting.  The networked structure of the resistance also contributes to its resilience 
because it does not offer targetable centers of leadership, command, and control whose 
removal can bring down the whole structure.   
An understanding of the systemic connections, support mechanisms, and 
regenerating capabilities of the resistance is critical in developing policies that lead it 
from network to dead-end.  The major common vulnerability of the various linkages that 
create these capabilities is the possibility of a significant portion of Sunni Iraqis realizing 
that their interests are better served through political engagement than violent resistance.  
If this realization is attained, many resistance groups will fight on, but the supporting 
connections between cells and from cells to the populace will dry up, leading the 
resistance from network to dead-end. 
The resistance in Iraq does not appear to be abating as of late 2005.  The weekly 
average of attacks has risen to around 600, nearly double the figure from early 2004.354  
August and October 2005 each saw 81 U.S. troops killed in hostile incidents, the third-
highest monthly toll since the invasion.355  Despite Sunni involvement in the referendum 
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stated that they will continue to fight the occupation, regardless of the political outcome 
of the referendum.356  The resistance is tenacious and two years of concentrated military 
action has not yet led its demise.   
A U.S. military official stated, "If someone would have told you that we would 
have killed 10,000, wounded 10,000 and imprisoned 32,000, you would have thought we 
would have won,” however, the resistance lives on because it is “self-regenerating.”357  
This self-regenerating capacity points to the fact that the resistance is not a collection of 
dead-enders, but a network with ties to support, expertise, and recruits.  The regime die-
hards have served as a cadre, around which a much wider resistance has formed from 
elements of Sunni society.  The regime cadre is not a centralized leadership, but it is an 
enabler in the form of finance, support, knowledge, and military ability that has helped 
other groups join the fight.  Themes of the resistance, including Sunni parochial motives 
and religious calls, assist in recruitment of fighters from the Sunni populace, allowing the 
resistance to regenerate cells operating within the web of support. 
Because there is no central, targetable leadership for the whole resistance, a more 
systemic approach must be used.  The nexus between groups must be evaluated and 
attacked.  The channels that provide finance, support, and recruits to the resistance must 
be stemmed.  Some of these tasks are functions of intelligence and military action; 
however, a systemic approach must be a balanced political and military strategy. 
 
A. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN GROUPS: FUNDING AND SUPPORT 
Support, in various forms, is the lifeblood of the resistance.  Many insurgencies 
have been successful with only a small cadre of activists and the acquiescence of the 
general populace.  The Iraqi populace has learned from Saddam’s rule “that the best way 
to survive is to stay out of conflicts between the powerful.”358  This passivity tends to 
support the resistance, but there are more active modes of support within the Sunni 
population.  The extension of resistance beyond a FRE hard core, the sustained support of  
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the various groups, and the tentative links between groups are important phenomena.  
These aspects demand a re-evaluation of the “dead-ender” label given to the FRE 
loyalists in this case. 
The connections between FRE and Islamic extremist groups are a division of 
labor with the FREs supplying funding, weapons, and logistics for the Islamists who 
provide motivated foot soldiers.359  This cooperation, despite radically different long-
term goals, is lubricated by the common short-term goal of ejecting the occupiers.  The 
more secular forces need the fanatical fighters, especially suicide bombers, which the 
Islamist groups can provide.  On the other hand, the Islamists need the funding, support, 
and expertise that nationalist groups have access to through the Ba’ath legacy.360  Former 
military and security leaders also provide tactical knowledge and leadership to groups of 
newly radicalized recruits.  The connection between the two groups is not representative 
of a unified front, but rather signifies the opportunistic collaboration of netwar actors. 
1. Financial Support 
All resistance groups require funding.  Many attacks are undertaken on a for-pay 
basis361 and increasingly sophisticated attacks are costly.362  The urban character of the 
resistance brings various requirements such as rent for safe-houses (for example, one 
handler has several in Baghdad and throughout the Sunni triangle),363 payment of 
salaries, transportation costs, and the like.364  There are three main sources of funding.  
Vast amounts of cash hidden or taken from the country by Ba’ath officials are controlled 
by FRE financiers in Syria and Iraq.  Evidence suggests that these financiers are funding 
not only FREs, but also Sunni nationalists and Islamists.365  Another source of funds is 
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donations from rich sympathizers, both inside and outside Iraq.366  Finally, crime 
provides income to fund many groups’ activities.367  Funding may yield a common 
vulnerability for these groups.   
Many of the attacks in Iraq are undertaken on a for-pay basis.  The bounty for 
successful attacks increased from around $500 just after the occupation to $3000-5000 by 
the end of 2003.368  Payment for attacks is a powerful lure when unemployment is 
thought to be over 50%.  One group of insurgents stated that they were paid around 
100,000 dinars (around $68) for two operations.369  Several resisters mentioned that they 
earned the title “emir” and a $1500 monthly salary by killing ten people.370  Pay provides 
a powerful incentive for unemployed men offered $100 to $300 per roadside bomb.371 
In contrast, few former government employees were able to find official 
employment.  Some of those who did, largely technicians and doctors, received a 
monthly salary of around $200 with the chance for a $50 bonus.372  CPA Order Number 
30 set the lowest monthly salary for government employees at 69,000 dinars (around 
$40).  The highest salary under the normal scale was 920,000 dinars (around $550).373  
Thus, payment for attacks is a strong lure, especially to former military and security men.  
Funds are needed to keep the large number of “part time” resisters in the fight. 
Abu Ali, a resister from the Sunni triangle, took “some time off from the resistance to do 
contract work for the occupation” because he needed “money to take care of his son.”   
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Although working for the occupation, Abu Ali continued to funnel part of his paycheck 
to his resistance cell.374  This account demonstrates the opportunism and complexity of 
the many facets of the resistance. 
American officials believe militant groups are funded by “‘unlimited money’ 
from an underground financial network run by former Ba’ath Party leaders and Saddam 
Hussein’s relatives.”  $500 million of Iraqi money in Syria remains unaccounted for.  
Contributions from outside sympathizers augment this windfall and appear to be flowing 
through Syria as well.375  Most of the money coming in from outside Iraq appears to be 
carried by cash couriers on well-established smuggling routes that significantly predate 
the invasion.376  The hawala system of informal money transfers is also prevalent in 
money smuggling and laundering, but it is difficult to crack down on due to the large 
numbers of legitimate people who depend on the system.377  Domestic funding also 
comes from “rich families, especially those who are in the construction, contracting, and 
commercial sectors in Al Anbar province.”378  Some of these wealthy Sunni businessmen 
are funding resistance groups for commercial reasons.  New foreign-investment laws and 
the influx of foreign goods have destroyed Iraqi businesses.  Increasing the violence 
reduces the competition from foreign businesses wary of investment and operation in an 
unstable Iraq.379   
The Iraqis organizing the major financing of the resistance are a small group.  
One report pins the size at “about 20 people, mostly operating outside Iraq.”  This group 
operates largely in Syria to collect and organize smuggling of funds, fighters, and 
weapons into Iraq.380  Financiers also outfit cell leaders throughout the Sunni areas then 
cell leaders recruit and run local operations.381 
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The small group of financiers is drawn mostly from families with close ties to 
Saddam.  The six sons of Saddam’s half-brother, Sabawi Ibrahim Hasan Al-Tikriti, as 
well as Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmed, a former Ba’ath Party official and Saddam aide, 
have been implicated as financiers and supporters of the resistance by the U.S. 
government.382   Sabawi Hasan al-Tikriti was handed over to Iraqi authorities in February 
2005 by Syria.383  Yasir Sabawi Ibrahim, a son of Sabawi labeled by one Iraqi authority 
as “the most dangerous man in the insurgency” for his financing activities, was arrested 
in Baghdad in October 2005 after Syrian authorities forced him to return to Iraq.  Ibrahim 
was reportedly second-in-command to Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmed, operating 
financially in Syria, Jordan and Yemen and serving as a financial link between Ba’athist 
resisters and Zarqawi’s group.  Another al-Tikriti son, Ayman, was sentenced to life in 
prison by Iraqi authorities in September for his links to the resistance.384  Al-Ahmed was 
listed as wanted for arrest by the Iraqi government in March 2005 for being a “financial 
facilitator and operational leader of the New Regional Command and New Ba’ath Party.” 
Fadhi Ibrahim Mahmud Mashhadani is also wanted as a “top member of the New Ba’ath 
Party and a key financier of insurgent and terrorist activity.”385  Syrian General Zuhayr 
Shalish and Asif Shalish, along with the Syrian SES International Corporation have also 
been identified as facilitators of the FRE financing activities within Syria.386     
Izz al-Din al-Majid, a key Zarqawi financier, was arrested in Fallujah in 
December 2004.  Majid had over $35 million in his bank accounts and reportedly had 
access to “$2 to $7 billion of former regime assets stolen from Iraqi government 
accounts.”  Under interrogation, Majid stated that his goal was to unite Ansar al-Sunnah, 
the Army of Muhammad, and the Islamic Resistance Army.387  Majid was a cousin and 
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former bodyguard of Saddam Hussein.388  Another tie between Zarqawi’s Islamists and 
the Army of Muhammad was Major General Abd Daoud Suleiman, who was arrested in 
early 2005.  Suleiman was one of the founders of the Army of Muhammad and was also a 
military advisor to Zarqawi.389  Other Zarqawi financiers have been identified by the 
U.S. government in Kuwait, Jordan, and Syria.390   
Crime provides another source of income for the resistance.  “‘Industrial scale’ 
criminal gangs” are well established in many urban areas.391  These elements are a strong 
potential ally for any resistance movement392 due to the “leaderless nexus” that provides 
for opportunistic collaboration of criminal and resistance networks.393   
Iraqi criminals under the former regime were involved in “oil smuggling and 
other enterprises” through a “widespread, globally networked criminal operation.”394  
These criminals appear to remain “under the influence of various former regime 
elements” and some collaborate with resistance groups.395  For example, Omar Hadid, a 
leader of one of the groups in Fallujah prior to the U.S. offensive, “ran a gangland-style 
operation,” financing his group through criminal enterprises as well as donations.396  
Criminal activities ranging from “low-level crime and extortion, to involvement in 
smuggling and drug trafficking” provide funds for resisters.  The endemic nature of 
organized crime that sprung up during the embargo years makes such criminal activity  
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difficult to counteract.397  U.S. military reports assert that around 80 percent of violent 
attacks in Iraq are purely criminal acts,398 further fueling the chaos that assists the 
resisters’ campaign.   
A Pentagon official asserts that resistance activity abates as funds run low 
between shipments, which are increasingly targeted.399  The capture of high-level 
financiers has led to the confiscation of large amounts of cash that would otherwise fuel 
attacks.  These financiers and their infiltration routes are a crucial chokepoint for 
targeting.  Creating a shortage of funds may also heighten tensions between groups by 
stiffening competition and thus highlighting long-term differences. 
Some of this financial support can be cut off through military and police work.  
Border security can be improved, smuggling routes can be policed, and high-level 
financiers can be targeted.  A good deal of support comes through sources embedded in 
Iraqi society, including mosques, hawala networks, and donations of local businessmen.  
These roots in the society are extremely difficult to extinguish through military action.  
Political solutions are needed to complement military action if financial starvation of the 
resistance is to work. 
2. Other Ties Between Resistance Groups 
An important set of links between groups are “handlers” who provide the support, 
intelligence, and organization for attacks.  One handler, interviewed under the 
pseudonym “Abu Qaqa al-Tamimi,” organizes attacks for several groups, from Islamic 
extremists to Iraqi nationalists.  Al-Tamimi was a Republican Guard officer under the 
former regime and claims to have been a messenger for Saddam Hussein during the early 
days of the resistance.  He has built a wide-ranging network of connections to varied 
groups.  He boasts, “Many people in the insurgency know me, even if they have never 
met me.”400  The networking function of this trained military officer shows how FRE 
hard-cores can serve as an enabler for the varied groups of resistance.     
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Journalist Alexis Debat, referring to U.S. military and intelligence sources, 
suggests that a Mukhabarat section charged with monitoring subversive groups in Iraq 
and neighboring states has provided officers that have served as contacts between FREs 
and Islamic extremists.  Mukhabarat officers have also been implicated in early 
recruitment of foreign fighters, mostly Palestinian refugees in Jordanian, Lebanese, and 
Syrian camps, before and during the war.401   
Debat also alleges that Wahhabi activists, secretly working in Iraq as early as the 
1980s, were able to build a “small but powerful following in the army, even enlisting one 
of the generals heading the Mukhabarat.”  These individuals then “openly joined” the 
radical jihadis following the collapse of the regime, serving as connections between FRE 
and Islamic extremist groups.402 
Collaboration has also extended to a political statement in at least one case.  The 
Ba’ath Party, Zarqawi’s group, and Ansar al-Sunnah jointly signed a November 24, 2004 
statement posted on the internet.  This statement denounced the Sharm al-Shaykh 
conference on Iraq.  The website pointed out that the Islamist groups signed the statement 
“which was written by the Ba’ath Party, not because we support this party or we are 
supporters of Saddam Husayn, but because the statement expresses the demands of the 
resistance groups in Iraq.”403    
Resistance groups have proven successful in networking for collaboration and 
support.  They have found willing recruits, both through parochial motives of the Sunni 
sub-state power structure and the powerful draw of religion.  Sunni society has not yet 
produced a leader capable or willing to call for an end to resistance activity.  Average 
citizens, conditioned by years of survival in Saddam’s police state, either openly support 
the violent resisters or maintain an apolitical passivity that harms the coalition more than 
the resistance.   
In this state, the resistance is like a tumor.  It lives in the organism, capable of 
drawing all that it needs from the populace and the network it has embedded within.  The 
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network feeds the resistance like blood vessels of the body feed the tumor.  Medical 
professionals have found that a novel way of starving the tumor is to attack the fast-
growing blood vessels that feed it.  Similarly, when a resister’s connection to society is 
cut off, he rapidly becomes a dead-ender.  Without support, concealment, and new 
recruits from society, the resister is trapped.  Some will lay down their arms and melt 
back into society.  Others will fight to the death.    
 
B. WHAT IS A DEAD-ENDER? 
In referring to the resistance as “dead-enders,” Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld compared them to the “Werewolves,”404 a Nazi guerilla resistance organization 
created in the late and desperate days of the Third Reich in World War II.  Differences 
between the resistance in Iraq and the Werewolves of Germany help to illustrate the 
strengths of the Iraqi resistance. 
The Werewolves were a resistance unit created in the later days of the war, under 
the direction of the SS-Police and tied to the Hitler Youth and the Nazi Party.  The 
Werewolves were not only meant as a resistance unit, but also as an enforcement unit in 
the face of faltering support for the Nazi regime.  Originating in 1944, they were part of a 
larger “Nazi ‘terror’” aimed at stiffening fanatical resistance and removing internal 
defeatists.405 
In his analysis of the Werewolf movement, Biddiscombe proposes two genres of 
resister.  Some resisters “fight for an idea” while others “hide out” from authorities.  The 
Werewolves largely fell into the later category that, Biddiscombe states, causes far fewer 
problems.406  While many in Iraq are hiding from some sort of authority, the ranks have 
expanded to include many who are fighting for an idea as well.  The weaknesses of the 
Werewolves illustrate the strengths of the resistance in Iraq. 
At the late stage in World War II when the Werewolves became active, German 
people “were eager to point out Nazi saboteurs” because they feared reprisals from the 
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occupiers, especially the Soviets.  In the Western zones, the occupiers were the only thing 
between the German populace and the feared Soviets.  The Werewolves were seen by the 
people as an invitation for trouble they did not want.  Furthermore, the sound defeat of 
Germany at the end of an exhaustive war deprived the resistance of a solid hope of 
victory and a real base of resources.  As a result of these factors, the Werewolves had 
little support from the German people and often found themselves hounded not only by 
the occupiers, but also by the German people themselves.407 
The Iraqi resistance has proven to exist in much different circumstances than the 
Werewolves.  While Iraq’s economy was devastated by Saddam’s rule, the level of 
exhaustion in Iraq is not comparable to that in Germany.  Furthermore, the Germans were 
soundly defeated as a nation in an epic conflict.  The Iraqi military was surely dismantled 
by an impressive campaign, but the waffling of the regime in Iraq did not leave the same 
impact that years of war did in Germany.  In fact, many of the most troubled areas in Iraq 
were relatively untouched by conventional military conflict.  Furthermore, the occupation 
in Iraq is not as pervasive as it was in Germany, nor is the fear of reprisals from the 
coalition similar to the fear of Soviet occupation.  The Iraqi case lacks many of the 
mitigating factors against successful resistance in the German case. 
In the Iraqi case, it appears that the regime prepared for some level of resistance, 
as did the Nazis, however, the Nazis failed to gain the support of the exhausted populace 
so the resisters were dead-enders.  In Iraq, the FREs have been followed by other 
elements of Iraqi society that stood to lose in the new Iraq.  Support for resistance has 
been swelled by tribal and identity ties, as well as the Sunni perception of being a 
targeted minority.  The resistance has proven able to regenerate itself because it has 
access to a population that is at least passively supportive.  The resistance has been able 
to recruit from motivated sectors of the population, despite its losses.  Where recruitment 
fails, resisters are able to pay for attacks or coerce the population into supporting their 
effort and force individuals to carry out attacks.408  Until the ability to feed off the people 
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is removed by denying the resistance access to Iraqi population centers, the resistance 
will continue to have a regenerative capacity.  Once the population ceases to support the 
resistance to the extent that the groups cannot regenerate, the dead-end will be imminent.   
 
C. FROM NETWORK TO DEAD-END 
In order to take the resistance from network to dead-end, it must be attacked as a 
system.  Militarily, the financiers and handlers that operate across numerous groups are a 
point that can be targeted with good downstream effects.  The infiltration routes of 
weapons, funds, and foreign fighters can be more heavily policed.  Better policing inside 
Iraq can cut down on crime, reducing the funds available to resistance groups from 
criminal activity.  These initiatives should be pursued, but they alone will not defeat the 
resistance system.  The resistance must be cut off from support and recruits originating 
within the Iraqi populace.  This can only be accomplished when a majority of Sunni 
Iraqis believe that violent resistance is not in their best interest.  The solution for truly 
defeating the system is mainly political.   
First, the maximalist groups must be cleaved from connections with other groups 
and from popular support.  This can only be achieved by delegitimizing their violence 
and their long-term political program.  The growing disgust of Iraqi Sunnis with the 
extremists, if allowed to continue, will remove societal support and solace for these 
organizations, allowing them to be militarily targeted with the support of the population.  
Second, the more moderate groups must be convinced that their interests can be secured 
more easily through political engagement than violent resistance.  Sunni participation in 
parliamentary elections in December may be a beginning of this process.  A study 
performed in July 2005 for the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, determined 
that political engagement of Sunnis and Sunni leaders, as well as removal of Sunni 
support from the extremist groups, were key tasks for success in Iraq,409 supporting these 
conclusions. 
The incompatible political visions of Ba’athists, Sunni nationalists, and Islamic 
extremists are an element that may assist in cleaving the network and thereby disrupting 
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the opportunistic collaboration that has been a strength of the resistance to this point.  
Recent developments point to growing friction between extreme jihadis and the more 
moderate groups.  Disagreement over increasingly violent tactics is one aspect of this 
friction.  Some analyses also suggest that Sunni nationalist groups have begun attempts 
“to reap political gain out of [their] violent roots.”  Focus on long-term political goals 
brings division between Iraqi nationalist groups on one hand and transnational and 
extremist groups on the other.  For example, Iraqi fighters have distributed fliers 
opposing the extremist groups’ tactics of kidnappings and civilian killings.410  Jihadis 
have proven sensitive to this rift, propagating lengthy sermons of Islamic justifications of 
their actions.411 
Heightened tensions between factions were evidenced when Islamic extremists 
tied to Zarqawi engaged local resisters in a firefight in Ramadi on November 6, 2005.  
Their dispute was reportedly over money, tactics, and involvement in the Iraqi political 
system.  According to Kamil Ahmed, a Ramadi resident with ties to local resistance 
groups, tensions between the parochial and Islamist groups started with Islamic 
extremists’ targeting of local police and heightened when the Islamists killed several 
tribal sheikhs critical of their programs.  The groups also differed over the October 
referendum, with parochial groups encouraging Sunnis to vote and Islamists rejecting 
political engagement.  According to Ahmad, the recent firefight came as Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
demanded a cut of the protection money that local businesses pay to parochial groups.  
“What we have now is a very severe split.  Open warfare isn’t far behind,” said 
Ahmed.412 
Disgust with the violence of the extremists may be leading to a higher willingness 
of Iraqis to provide tips on resistance activity.413  Some of these frictions may be a 
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product of a budding power struggle for dominance in some Sunni areas where 
nationalist Sunni resistance leaders are being overtaken by domestic Sunni Islamists.414  
As violence and competition for power intensify, religion may not prove flexible enough 
to justify all resistance groups.  Even Abu Qaqa al-Tamimi, a handler for Islamic 
extremist suicide bombers sees the conflict coming.  He says that the groups never have 
an answer for what their vision of future Iraq is.  He believes that “one day, when the 
Americans have gone, we will need to fight another war, against these jihadis.  They 
won’t leave quietly.”415 
As for political participation, the indicators are mixed.  Sunnis turned out in 
higher numbers for the constitution referendum in October 2005 than they had for the 
January elections, but voted overwhelmingly against the draft.416  Furthermore, resisters’ 
vows to continue armed opposition to occupation417 do not portend an end to the violence 
stemming from this vote.  There are some hopeful signs, however. 
The Iraqi Concord Front was created on October 26, 2005 as the Iraqi Islamic 
Party, the National Dialogue Council, and the Iraqi People’s Gathering, all Sunni groups, 
united to prepare for the December 15 parliamentary elections.  While two of these 
groups opposed the constitution in the October referendum, they are attempting to create 
a “unified Arab Sunni bloc” for parliamentary elections, in the words of Mahmoud al-
Mashahadani, a former member of the National Dialogue Council (NDC).  “If we 
succeed, then we will be able to persuade the resisters to use the political solution.  We 
will tell the resisters: ‘Come and talk with us – we could represent you.  We are Arab 
Sunni; we can be the best mediator.’”418   
On the other hand, some Sunni leaders are unsure of Sunni participation in the 
election.  Saleh Mutlaq, another member of the NDC, was against the constitution, but 
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still plans on joining a political coalition of all Iraqi ethnicities for the upcoming 
elections.  He believes that voter fraud in Nineveh and Diyala provinces were the reason 
for the successful passage of the constitution. (The vote in Nineveh was reported as 55% 
against,419 Diyala 51% for, Salahadeen 82% against, and Anbar 97% against.  Three 
provinces were required to vote the draft down by a two-thirds majority in order for the 
constitution to fail nationally.420)  Abdul al-Kubaisi, a prominent Sunni cleric was more 
direct in his charges of fraud.  “The noes have been changed just to approve the 
American conspiracy to steal the history and the past of the present Iraq.”421  For these 
reasons, Mutlaq and his associates “are not sure if [the Sunni people] will vote.  The 
lesson was very bad.  This is what worries us.”422 
In the end, the question of Sunni political engagement is not one that can be 
solved by American military action or overt political initiatives.  At best, the U.S. can 
attempt to provide advice to those leaders in the government who will listen, that Sunni 
engagement must be won.  Additionally, the coalition must do its best to provide security 
to Sunni Iraqis without further inflaming passions through heavy-handed tactics or 
inadvertent civilian deaths.  In a more stable environment, Sunni society must aggregate 
its voice and work out its involvement in the politics of the new Iraq.  For many Sunnis, 
the new Iraqi government is a second-best solution, but it is increasingly viewed as a 
much better future than continued violence and extremism. 
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V. CONCLUSION: REGIME CHANGE  
OR STATE AND SOCIETY CHANGE? 
Returning to the outset, one can ask, “How does this exploration of the Iraqi case 
help to explain, plan for, and predict resistance to transition?”  First of all, looking at the 
resistance within the context of transition has provided an opportunity to go beyond a 
litany tactics and groups in order to explain why the resistance erupted and what 
structures and motivations the resistance was rooted in.  This thesis was largely 
explanation. 
An explanation of the roots of Iraqi resistance has also illuminated some factors 
that will help in planning a balanced policy for the successful consolidation of transition 
in Iraq.  The insights gained in this pursuit can also be applied when examining future 
cases of transition for potential trouble areas.  Transition scholarship must provide a more 
nuanced typology of regime attributes that impact the process and actors of transition.  
Such a typology will help to overcome some basic assumptions about transition that may 
not prove relevant to many future cases of reform in the developing world. 
In November 2005, there is much hope for Iraq.  There are also many pitfalls on 
the road ahead.  The plan for success in Iraq must be a balanced strategy that drives the 
Iraqi Sunni population to political engagement and leads the Iraqi resistance to a dead-
end.  If Iraqi Sunnis become increasingly engaged in the political process over the next 
12 months, support and recruits for the resistance will wane, information about resistance 
activity will increase, and some fighters will lay down their arms, satisfied that they have 
an acceptable future in Iraq.  Others will continue to fight, but they will be cut off from 
support and unable to replace their losses.  They will be dead-enders, hunted by 
combined Iraqi and coalition forces and shunned by the Iraqi people.   
On the other hand, Sunni Iraqis may not come out and vote in large numbers in 
December.  Security concerns may win the day if resistance groups target polling 
stations.  Sunni disillusionment over perceived fraud in the October referendum may also 
hurt voter turnout.  In this case, the future will be bleaker, but there are still concrete 
initiatives that can be pursued, based on the case laid out above. 
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First, all efforts must be made to convince Sunnis that their interests are safe in a 
peaceful governmental process.  Perceptions of voting fraud must be addressed and 
Sunnis should be encouraged to vote, especially by emphasis on their opportunity to 
amend the constitution through the elected parliament.  Second, a balanced political and 
military strategy should be followed to isolate the resistance from the population.  
Starting with areas held by the most extreme groups, trouble areas must be cleared and 
held by coalition and Iraqi troops.  This initiative must be accompanied by political 
dialogue to convince Sunni Iraqis that the extremist resisters, if left unchecked, will 
destroy their country.  Third, Iraqi forces must continue to be trained efficiently and 
swiftly so that they may take the lead in maintaining secure Sunni cities, free of extremist 
violence.  The only maintainable end state is one maintained by Iraqi politicians, police 
officers, and security forces.  By reviewing the nature of the resistance and pointing out 
some key issues, implications for the future of Iraq and the study of transition in general 
may be highlighted. 
 
A. EXPLAIN:  WHY DID IRAQI RESISTANCE ERUPT? 
It is impossible to know if resistance in Iraq could have been somehow avoided, 
but the underlying reasons for resistance and the legacies of the former regime that fueled 
the resistance have been identified.  The resistance in Iraq is primarily Sunni.  The cadre 
of this resistance consists of former members of the regime, whose ranks have been 
swelled by other Sunnis motivated to resist for a number of reasons.  Foreign volunteers 
have also made their impact for largely religious reasons.  The addition of these other 
resisters to the cadre of FREs has created a self-regenerating resistance with a core of 
networked, military-trained, and well-supplied Iraqis who have provided assistance to 
numerous groups in the form of financial support, intelligence, and trained fighters and 
leaders. 
Sunnis lost their predominant position with the fall of the Hussein regime.  The 
Iraqis most immediately affected by the transition were members of the former regime 
with immediate access to the training and connections that enabled them to mount an 
effective resistance.  The legacy of Saddam’s rule gave this hard core of the former 
regime the motive to resist and the structures that made resistance effective.  Members of 
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state security and intelligence services, as well as elite military units, were part of a 
patrimonial coercive apparatus423 that afforded them status, power, and complicity in 
regime repression.  These servants had everything to lose in the new Iraq.  Their jobs, 
their status, and their power were gone and they faced possible retribution or prosecution 
to boot.  With little hope for their future in a new, Shi’ite-dominated Iraq, these well-
trained officers quickly turned to violent resistance to the occupation. 
The hard core existed within a structure that greatly assisted their struggle.  The 
Iraqi security apparatus consisted of layers of connected and redundant agencies.  These 
agencies were well-versed in various intelligence and subversive warfare techniques.  
With the collapse of the regime, these security services devolved into cells of well-trained 
and disenfranchised Iraqis, many of whom took up arms.  Influential Iraqis in close 
proximity to Saddam maintained connections to many individuals in the security services.  
They also had access to large amounts of cash and weapons stockpiled around the nation.  
Many of these high-level former regime elements became financiers and supporters of the 
many cells of resistance. 
Motivation for resistance spread beyond the hard core of the regime through 
structural ties between the regime and society.  Many Sunnis were patronized by the 
regime in the form of power, public works, and jobs that were lost with the fall of the 
regime.  Powerful tribes, made largely autonomous in Saddam’s later years, also stood to 
lose in the new Iraq.  Along with these motivations, kinship ties to hard core resisters and 
the perception of U.S. targeting of Sunnis exacerbated motivations to resist.  Thus, hard 
core resistance soon extended to non-regime Sunnis who were offended by coalition 
missteps or who took up arms in vengeance for the death of a family or tribe member.  
Heavily-armed tribal militias and gangs easily transitioned to resistance, often with the 
leadership of a kinsman from the lower-levels of the former regime security apparatus. 
Religion has also proven to be a force through which resistance expanded.  
Saddam attempted to re-Islamize Iraq as a way of legitimizing his rule and extending his 
control of society.  At the same time, Iraqis increasingly turned to religion for solace 
from the great hardships of life under repression and sanctions.  The tumult of the 
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invasion and occupation has increased this trend.  Many Sunnis heeded a religious call to 
resist occupation that was couched in modern interpretations of Islamic doctrines of 
jihad.  The religious motivations have provided willing volunteers both within Iraq and 
from other Islamic populations.  The power of religious networks has provided recruits 
willing to undertake suicide missions, drawing fighters from near and far.  Religious 
structures have also provided another avenue of funding and support for various 
resistance groups.   
A common thread between these groups is that they are all actors that covet state 
powers and usurp the state’s monopoly on the use of force, but they are not constrained 
by the rules and processes through which states must act.  Security servants, tribal 
networks, religious leaders, and influential Sunni farmers and businessmen all were able 
to personally benefit from Saddam’s rule in return for their loyalty.  These actors set up a 
power structure beneath the state where they were able to enjoy a good degree of local 
autonomy and personal gain.  A weakened central government willingly gave up its state 
powers to these actors in turn for loyalty and stability in the Sunni areas.  The 
recentralization of state powers under a new order was almost sure to be resisted by this 
sub-national power structure. 
 
B. PLAN:  POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF IRAQI TRANSITION 
Analysis of the tactics of the insurgents yields little in the way of policy 
prescriptions, besides counter-tactics.  Explanation of the legacy that spawned resistance 
provides an understanding of the motivations and structural issues underlying the current 
situation.  These factors can provide a basis for sound policy prescription that addresses 
root issues, rather than symptoms. 
The legacy that led to resistance was the Sunni power structure in Iraq.  Sunnis 
became accustomed to the way things were.  While many welcomed the ouster of 
Saddam, they did not welcome a restructuring of Iraq that would empower the Shi’a at 
their expense.  The Sunnis cannot and should not be restored to a position of dominance 
in Iraq.  Sunnis must, however, be convinced that there is a place for them in the new Iraq 
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and that their interests can be secured politically, but not militarily.  Senator Richard 
Lugar expresses this eloquently. 
It has become common in discussions of Iraq to say that without security 
little can be achieved politically or economically. But it is also important 
to understand that there is no purely military solution in Iraq. Success 
depends on establishing a political process that gives all the major ethnic 
groups a stake in the government. It is notable that insurgent attacks in 
some Sunni areas were intentionally suspended during the voting to allow 
Sunni voters to go to the polls in the hope of defeating the Constitution at 
the ballot box. This demonstrated that a substantial element of the 
insurgency is focused on the political outcome in Iraq, not merely on 
nihilistic terrorist philosophies.424  
Political engagement of the Sunnis is critical.  Officials in Iraq must be attuned to 
signals that some Sunni resistance groups are focused on a political outcome.  Political 
engagement will not serve to unduly “legitimize” violent resisters; rather, it will convince 
violent resisters to become engaged in a political process which is non-violent.  Success 
in the political arena, or more simply, the perception that the Sunni voice can make a 
difference politically, is a necessary factor in removing the support for violent resistance.   
Some resisters are highly unlikely to give up violence.  The true die-hards will 
likely prove to be the radical Islamists and the most hard core Ba’athists who face 
prosecution and revenge for their complicity in Saddam’s crimes and those they have 
committed since 2003.  The other elements of the resistance, such as the Iraqi 
nationalists, the “part time” resisters, and the societal supporters of the resistance, will be 
willing to give up their support of violence for an acceptable political solution. 
The resistance is a Sunni Iraqi problem.  The most influential players in the 
resistance are prominent Sunni Iraqis from the former regime who provide support and 
solace to the fighters, often from neighboring states.  Foreign fighters are a minority in 
the resistance, but their tactics and information operations cause disproportionate impact.  
These foreign fighters rely heavily on Iraqi support for infiltration, intelligence, and  
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operations within Iraq.  Thus, a politically engaged Sunni Iraqi population can be 
convinced to cut off the foreign (and Iraqi) extremists, making them dead-enders, easily 
targeted by military action.   
Although the resistance is largely Sunni, the Sunnis are not all resisters.  
Transition scholars predict that actors in the transition are “likely to be divided and 
hesitant about their interests and ideals and, hence, incapable of coherent collective 
action.”425  Indeed, the Sunnis are divided among themselves.  Based on two years of 
reporting from Iraq, Patrick Graham observed “a society feeling its way into the future, 
almost blindly and without consensus.”  He observes that the confusion has prevented the 
resistance from becoming more cohesive and widespread,426 but such confusion also 
impairs the ability to raise a coherent Sunni alternative to the resistance.  Recent attempts 
at consolidation of a Sunni political bloc for the December elections are a step in the right 
direction: toward a coherent Sunni voice interested in peaceful political engagement. 
Inside Iraq, policy must address the motivations for continued Sunni resistance.  
Iraqi Sunnis feel disenfranchised and targeted.  They believe that “they are the natural 
rulers” of Iraq.  They fear the influence of Iran that could be expressed through Shi’ite 
dominance in Iraq.  The Sunni also “feel that they will not share in Iraq’s enormous 
wealth” under Shi’a rule.  The belief, reportedly held by many Sunnis, that Sunni Arabs 
and Sunni Kurds actually form a majority in Iraq makes Shi’a dominance even more 
unpalatable.427   
Some Sunnis believe their only recourse is through violence.  Graham observed, 
“Most Sunnis that I met were ambivalent about the insurgency, but the occupation did 
little to win them over.”428 For Sunnis, the best future would be one where they 
continued to enjoy the privileges of minority rule in Iraq.  This is the vision that some are 
fighting for and others are unwilling to give up.  They must be convinced that the “best 
case” is unobtainable and that they must turn to a second-best solution of political 
engagement in a federal Iraq.   
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Only when Sunnis realize that second-best is not so bad will they turn 
wholeheartedly to politics.  Implicit in this is a disavowal of violence as a method 
through which they can return to dominance.  Sunnis must be convinced of the costs of 
continued violence.  They have already shut themselves out of the initial drafting of the 
constitution.  They have since been given a chance to amend the constitution through the 
offices of the Iraqi parliament.  If violence continues to rule the Sunni areas, they may 
well miss out on this chance to shape the constitution to their liking. 
The Iraqi Sunnis cannot rid their areas of violence without help.  Until recently, 
the coalition’s cycle of clearing, leaving, and returning to Sunni areas did little to secure 
support.  Coalition forces clear a town of well-established resistance elements.  Due to 
manpower constraints and tactics currently used, the forces are then forced to leave the 
cleared town to sweep another area.  Meanwhile, resistance elements slowly move back 
in, recruiting newly motivated Iraqis as they go, and within several months the resistance 
is again well-entrenched.  Before long, coalition troops are forced to return to once again 
clear the town.429   
Facile comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam abound, but the phenomenon of 
clearing the same real estate at high human cost, multiple times is one we must learn to 
avoid.  In order to truly clear a town of resistance, troops must clear and stay.  
Krepinevich recommends such a strategy in an influential article in Foreign Affairs.  
Under this strategy, a unit would clear an area of resistance elements and then break up 
into smaller formations to provide local security throughout the cleared area.  During this 
period, the coalition troops would also train and assist local police by combined 
patrolling and operations, eventually giving way to capable Iraqi forces.  This strategy 
would provide the long-term stability within a given area that is required for 
reconstruction, social reform, and winning the support of the populace.430   
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice asserts that the coalition is actively pursuing a 
similar strategy.  “With the Iraqi government, our strategy – the key – is to clear [the 
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toughest places... and disrupt foreign support], hold [secure areas, integrating political 
and economic outreach] and build [truly national institutions]… None of these elements 
can be achieved by military action alone.”  Secretary Rice admits that holding territory 
once cleared has been a problem area to date, but increasingly capable Iraqi units are the 
key to success in this area.431  These policy statements appear to be in synch with events 
on the ground in Iraq.  Lieutenant Colonel Julian Alford, commander of a Marine 
battalion in western Iraq, recently stated, “We’re not sweeping any area unless we can 
leave a platoon of Marines and a platoon of Iraqis there…  It’s fruitless unless you leave 
behind Marines and Iraqi soldiers to do ... counterinsurgency.”432   
On the other hand, Alford’s superior, Colonel Stephen Davis was paraphrased as 
saying that he is “attempting to disprove the notion that a counterinsurgency cannot be 
won simply by killing insurgents.”433  All military, diplomatic, and political efforts must 
be synchronized in Iraq to feed into a balanced strategy that addresses the roots of the 
resistance, as well as the symptoms.  Simply killing insurgents will not defeat a network 
that can self-regenerate.  Only a systemic approach, like the clear, hold, and build 
strategy, can cut off resistance cells.  The three policy areas emphasized in the opening of 
the chapter feed directly into this strategy. 
Sunni engagement in the political process feeds directly into the rejection of 
extremists that will assist in clearing, holding, and building.   The importance of Iraqi 
security forces in holding cleared terrain also demands Sunni engagement in the new 
government.  To this end, the Ministry of Defense recently announced that it welcomes 
Iraqi officers with the rank of major or below from the old army to apply for the new 
security forces.  This move, seen as targeted at Sunnis, has been received with cautious 
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optimism by some Sunnis.434  Clearing and holding terrain is also a start toward isolating 
resisters from the population.  Political and economic outreach are key areas that must be 
emphasized in order to truly get to the root of Sunni motivations for resistance. Finally, 
the building of Iraqi national institutions, including diverse Iraqi security forces, is the 
ticket to an end state that can be managed by Iraqis.   
Had analysts and planners more thoroughly investigated and heeded the lessons of 
transition, some of the trouble areas for Iraqi transition may have been identified earlier.  
Such an analytical approach may have provided an earlier recognition of the roots of the 
Sunni resistance in the legacies of Saddam’s rule, rather than a dismissal of the violence 
as the last gasp of a few dead-enders.  The transition in Iraq should be carefully watched 
and aggressively analyzed to provide lessons for future transitions. 
 
C. PREDICT:  CREATING A NEW BASELINE OF ASSUMPTIONS FOR 
TRANSITION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Placing the Iraqi case within the body of literature on transition provides some 
predictive value for other cases of transition in the developing world.  Scholars have 
thoroughly examined cases of transition in Europe and Latin America.  The conclusions 
from their work have been used to illuminate the Iraqi case.  The basic assumptions that 
have guided theoretical perspectives regarding the shape, process, and actors of transition 
need to be revisited, however, as the focus of transition scholars shifts from the cases of 
the past to the cases to come in the developing world.  The Iraqi experience provides 
some salient points for consideration regarding potential outcomes of other cases of 
transition sure to confront the Middle East and the rest of the developing world. 
Iraq takes up an important position within the literature on transition for several 
reasons.  First, as an Arab and Islamic country confronting a major effort at transition 
from repressive rule toward democracy, it holds some important attributes in common 
with other states that may confront transition in the future.  Second, Iraq is the most 
prominent case of externally-monitored transition since the post-World War II 
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occupations.  The lessons for externally-monitored transition may prove important for 
future efforts to shepherd states through transition.  Such cases may result from 
intervention before or after state-collapse, or civil or international war.  Third, Iraq is a 
test case for the idea of “regime change” transition and has significant implications for 
the feasibility of such an endeavor.  For these reasons, the Iraqi case should figure 
prominently as scholars wrestle with future cases of transition.  
The literature on transition has provided a useful lens in searching for the legacies 
of Saddam’s rule and in determining how those legacies impact the process of transition 
in Iraq.  The literature does not, however, provide much guidance regarding the process 
of transition as it unfolds in Iraq, nor does it inform policies designed to guide Iraq from 
the legacies of its patrimonial past to a more democratic future.  In its current state, the 
literature on transition does not provide a robust mechanism for evaluating and 
addressing the gamut of actors and paths likely to characterize transition in the twenty-
first century.  Transition literature has several key flaws that must be addressed in order 
for it to prove relevant to the coming cases of transition.  Assumptions about how 
transitions will be initiated, about the actors that will figure prominently in transition, and 
about the prerequisites for and impediments to democracy must be readdressed in light of 
the regime types yet to face democratic opening in the developing world. 
First, transition scholars’ assumptions regarding the basics of how transition is 
likely to occur must be re-evaluated.  Stepan argues that “the overwhelming majority of 
cases of redemocratization have been and will be ones in which sociopolitical forces 
rather than external military forces play the key role.”435  O’Donnell and Schmitter 
boldly state “that there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or 
indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along 
the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners.”436  Most other evaluations 
of transition follow the same basic assumptions.437 
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These assumptions are flawed when it comes to the regime types existing in much 
of the developing world, where meaningful openings are increasingly unlikely to be the 
result of splits in the regime or of well-developed campaigns from below.  The literature 
has given little attention to different regime types due to the relative homogeneity of 
structures in the European and Latin American cases.438  Many regimes in the developing 
world are characterized by neo-patrimonialism, “a form of organization in which 
relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system 
which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines.”  The power of state officials is 
used largely for personal purposes, rather than public good, and the patron-client relations 
that pervade the state yield a personalistic rule, rather than a rational-legal 
professionalism.439   
In neo-patrimonial regimes, the ruling elites are unlikely to split over ideologies 
of political reform into hard-liner and soft-liner groups.  When fractures do occur, they 
are more likely to be the result of a struggle over dwindling resources than one over 
promotion of political reform.440  Not surprisingly, most transitions in neo-patrimonial 
regimes appear to be initiated from below, yet the destruction of civil society in these 
states and the regime’s willingness to hold out until collapse ensure that efforts toward 
transition from below are “spontaneous, sporadic, disorganized, and unsustained,” greatly 
damaging the prospects for successful consolidation of democracy.441   Furthermore, neo-
patrimonial regimes “are susceptible to institutional collapse when patronage resources 
run dry.”442  Thus, transition in these cases can be expected to be much more chaotic and 
much more difficult to negotiate than earlier transitions in Europe and Latin America. 
Traditional transition theorists also assume that authoritarian rule is a transitory 
state that must give way to an opening, in which the public will demand “the removal of 
the authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democratic one.”443  Observers have 
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noted recently that “liberalized autocracy has proven far more durable than once 
imagined” becoming “a type of political system whose institutions, rules, and logic defy 
any linear model of democratization.”444  If this countervailing observation is true, and if 
the assumptions that transition must come from within are also correct, then new 
democracies should be few and far between in the future.   
Furthermore, Stepan postulates that “it is virtually impossible” for the conditions 
that supported the externally monitored transitions of West Germany, Japan, Italy, and 
Austria to reappear;445 yet, two ambitious externally-monitored transitions have been 
initiated in the past few years in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Meanwhile, some influential 
scholars are arguing that states and international institutions should embark on ambitious 
projects amounting to externally-monitored installations in failed states and post-conflict 
situations in the developing world.446 
In an increasingly interconnected world, it is difficult to allow persistent unrest 
following the collapse of autocratic forms of rule.  In some cases, extensive unilateral or 
international monitoring may be necessary during transitions in order to avoid 
humanitarian catastrophes, to assist in institution-building, and to avoid spill-over effects 
on regional and global security.  The paucity of rational-legal institutional development 
in many states of the developing world mean that future transitions will have to 
“democratize while… grappling with the reality of building a state from scratch or coping 
with an existent but largely nonfunctional state.”447  Such a daunting task is unlikely to 
succeed without considerable external assistance. 
Transition scholarship must reconcile basic assumptions with the changing 
evaluation of the tenacity of autocratic regimes and the recent cases of externally 
monitored installation in order to remain relevant.  In the words of one scholar, “reality is 
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no longer conforming to the model” set forth by early transition scholars.448  Some 
important issues include the likelihood of self-initiated opening and transition in the 
world’s more persistent autocracies, the implications of neo-patrimonial regime types on 
transition assumptions, the anticipated prevalence of externally monitored installations 
(either externally imposed regime changes or robust external monitoring after collapse or 
during transition), and the implications of tenacious autocracies for latent institutions that 
will impact transition in the developing world.   
Iraq is a landmark case for the study of externally monitored transition.  The 
tenacity of the regime in holding on to power despite severe outside pressure calls into 
question any hope that Iraq might have initiated a transition (beyond a palace coup or 
succession struggle within the elite) without external involvement.  The effect of the 
regime on latent institutions in state and society also raises severe doubts about the ability 
of such states to successfully install a democratic government without robust and 
sustained external monitoring and assistance.  This is not to advocate more cases of 
forceful regime change, but to raise the question of whether many developing states will 
be able to successfully transition from autocracy to democracy in future cases of regime 
collapse without significant external assistance.  
Second, the types of actors arising from such transitions are different than those 
observed in the Latin American and European cases.  Traditional scholarship expected 
the authoritarian regime to figure prominently in the transition, maintaining control over 
many aspects of the rules and procedures that might govern the process of transition.449  
Regime soft-liners are expected to be a critical element in creating an opening, for they 
are the first to recognize that the regime will require “some form of electoral 
legitimation” in the near future.  To prepare for such legitimation, the soft-liners 
recommend the reintroduction of “certain freedoms.”450  In such a model, regime soft-
liners and moderates in the opposition can make a pact that leads to a successful 
transition.   
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As noted above, however, many authoritarian regimes in the developing world 
have found ways to sustain their rule without opening to meaningful electoral 
legitimation.  If this observation continues to hold true, one can expect that authoritarian 
regimes will be able to hold onto power without meaningful opening until some crisis 
event (war, revolution, or economic collapse) topples the regime.  Regimes may also 
slowly destroy the state without creating any space for liberalization.   
In such cases, the actors faced with transition will be much different than those 
considered in the European and Latin American cases.  The regime will not expect that 
electoral legitimation is necessary, so there will be no soft-liner push for opening.  
Furthermore, elite actors in the neo-patrimonial regimes that are prevalent in the Middle 
East and Africa are likely to split over the “spoils” of patrimonial distribution, not over a 
decision to liberalize.451  Regime elites facing crisis are unlikely to be thinking about 
liberalization and will be in a very disadvantageous position for any sort of pacted 
transition.  If international agents attempt to monitor and assist the transition, regime 
actors may be ousted almost entirely, as was the case in Iraq.  In this case, negotiations 
take on a much different character than the give and take of a pacted transition between 
regime soft-liners and opposition moderates.  The remaining actors in society are often 
split and confused over their roles in the new order.  Poorly developed civil society and a 
lack of soft-liner regime elites and unifying opposition leadership figures in society leave 
latent institutions of the former regime and traditional social structures as key actors in 
the transition.   
An observer of state failure noted, “State collapse begins when the central state 
starts to deteriorate, leading to the fractionalization of society, with loyalties shifting from 
the state to traditional communities that seem to offer better protection.”452  In Iraq, this 
process was definitely underway by the 1990s as Saddam and the Iraqi populace turned to 
tribal and Islamic structures for solace and stability.  When combined with the ethnic and 
religious fault-lines in much of the developing world, the latent institutions of primary 
identity are likely to figure much more prominently in future as actors in transition.  
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Where civil society is believed to be a major boost for budding democracies, the latent 
institutions of primary identity in mixed states are contentious for transition.  The lack of 
civil society and the contentious nature of sectarian and ethnic politics in Iraq have 
inflamed the chaos of transition.  The legacy of patrimonial rule, combined with a 
weakened state and a divided population, yielded latent institutions and motivations that 
are key features in Iraq and will bear directly on future cases of transition.  Integrating  
existing scholarship on the role of the latent institutions of primary identity and 
patrimonial security services into scholarship on new transitions will greatly enhance 
understanding of future cases.   
Third, the debate over prerequisites for democracy and obstacles to transition 
must be transcended.  Schmitter argues, “The root hypothesis is that for an effective and 
enduring challenge to authoritarian rule to be mounted, and for political democracy to 
become and remain an alternative mode of political domination, a country must possess a 
civil society in which certain community and group identities exist independent of the 
state and in which certain types of self-constituted units are capable of acting 
autonomously in defense of their own interests and ideals.”453   Numerous other factors 
that highly correlate with successful democratic transition have been noted, as have 
prominent road blocks.  Instead of assuming certain attributes must pre-exist and others 
must not be present, transition scholarship should examine how states and societies can 
get from point A to point B in order to attain the characteristics that provide hope for 
democracy. 
Bellin has observed that states in the Middle East and North Africa have not only 
failed at transition, but most states “have failed to initiate transition at all.”  It is not the 
lack of prerequisites, but the presence of obstacles, “specifically, a robust coercive 
apparatus in these states,” that explains the failure to transition.454 The observation that 
transition is most likely to be initiated from below in neo-patrimonial regimes455 presents 
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a particular problem in the Middle East.  In addition to the problems of collective action 
in societies plagued by clientelism and a lack of civil society, the oil and strategic rents of 
the Middle East fuel a robust coercive apparatus that can repress any stirring for 
democratic opening from below.456    
Bellin’s conclusions present a conundrum for those hoping to observe transition 
in the Middle East.  Removal of the coercive apparatus is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for democratic transition in her eyes.  The underlying prerequisites for 
democracy must also be fostered in order for transition to be a success; therefore, “in the 
absence of effective state institutions, removing an oppressive coercive apparatus will 
lead, not to democracy, but rather to authoritarianism of a different stripe or, worse, 
chaos.”457  Removing the coercive apparatus will not lead to democracy, but with the 
coercive apparatus in place, there is little hope for building the “effective, impartial state 
institutions” and “associations that reach across ethnic lines,”458 that Bellin recommends.  
It is this sort of circular logic that must be transcended by new transition scholarship. 
Can political reform be enacted while a coercive patrimonial apparatus is in 
place?  If not, how can the apparatus be weakened or removed, allowing the foundations 
of civil society and rational institutions to be built?  These are thorny questions.  At the 
bottom line, whether a coercive apparatus is removed by force or topples of its own 
accord, there is little hope that the robust, rational, and cross-cutting institutions of state 
and society that are considered to be a prerequisite of democracy will exist in many 
future cases of transition.  Therefore, transition scholars and policy-makers must 
recognize this likelihood and study the case of Iraq for clues as to how a transitory state 
can be nurtured from the chaos of the conflictual latent institutions of neo-patrimonialism 
to a more stable, consensual political arrangement.  By changing the basic assumptions 
about the way in which transitions will be initiated, the shape of state and society at the 
beginning of transition, and the actors who will figure prominently in transition; the 
debate over what conditions must be present or absent for successful transition can be 
transcended.  With these theoretical adjustments, scholars may be able to suggest ways of 
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removing obstacles and moving toward the prerequisites rather than assuming that these 
conditions will be met before transition begins. 
The extensive legacies of neo-patrimonial rule, compounded by rentier 
economies, weakened state structures, empowered traditional institutions, and a context 
of religious radicalism call into question the feasibility of a “plug and play” version of 
regime change.  A more systemic approach to rehabilitating state and society will be 
called for when regimes weaken and topple, or open to transition.  Installing a new 
government will do little if security and stability is not rapidly provided to avoid a 
descent into chaos.  Stemming early violence may assist in maintaining control over the 
trajectory of transition and encouraging the emergence of peaceful opposition, rather than 
violent resistance.  Early efforts toward creating stability must be rapidly augmented by a 
balanced set of initiatives aimed at addressing the deep seated motives and structures that 
will confront the new order.  All of these efforts can be greatly aided by a re-examination 
of the phenomenon of transition. 
In order to redress the problems with basic assumptions, new scholarship on 
transition in the developing world should develop a more nuanced system of state 
typologies as they bear on the potential process, actors, and substance of transition.  
Expanding on the typology of neopatrimonial regimes developed by Bratton and Van de 
Walle,459 states in the developing world can be evaluated with regard to the degree of 
patrimonialism, regime coercion, external rents, ethnic and sectarian division, political 
participation, and political competition present.  High degrees of patrimonialism, regime 
coercion, sectarian division, and to some extent external rents characterized the state of 
Iraq.  These factors left a contentious legacy and a paucity of civil society and rational-
legal state institutions.  Due to these factors, political competition and participation were 
virtually non-existent in Iraq.  Expanding outward from Iraq, the other states of the 
Middle East and developing world could be evaluated along these lines.  Understanding 
the degree to which these factors are present and their expected impact on state and 
societal institutions will provide a much more nuanced estimation of transition prospects  
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and pitfalls.  Furthermore, this system can also be used to codify and examine past cases 
of transition in order to provide a more robust empirical data set to inform transition 
scholarship. 
The case of Iraq dramatically demonstrates some of the many contentious legacies 
of tenacious, patrimonial coercive autocracies.  These are the legacies that must be 
addressed in order for transition to proceed from the most contentious starting point 
toward a more consensual and stable form of government.  Latent institutions figure 
prominently in such transitions.  The institutions of the regime produce a class of former 
regime elements who identify personally with the status quo and are faced with very high 
costs of reform.  These former regime elements are often tied into traditional structures of 
primary identity, further complicating reform.  Latent institutions within the society are 
often enhanced by the waning power of the central state.  Unable to exert the control 
integral to continued survival, ruling elites turn to traditional structures of ethnicity, 
religion, and family identity to extend their reach and cement their control of society.  
These empowered social institutions are the antithesis of civil society.  They combine 
primary identity, state patronage, and personal profit in one package, denying the cross-
cutting ties that make consensual politics more palatable.  Furthermore, economic 
dysfunction and rampant criminal activity are likely to further complicate the landscape 
and undermine the centralization of impartial and effective state institutions.  These are 
huge obstacles to be sure, but scholarship on transition must not assume them away.  The 
unenviable task of determining how to overcome these legacies and to lead such a 
troubled transitory state toward a better political arrangement has begun in Iraq.  The 
duty of scholars is to examine this case and to fully analyze its triumphs and tragedies, 
looking for lessons that may serve to assist other peoples in finding their way from 
coercive autocracy toward a better life. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The case of transition in Iraq is far from completion.  The Iraqi people could 
continue their tenacious, slow progress toward a successful consolidation of a democratic 
government.  If the roots of the resistance in Iraq are not addressed, however, violence 
will continue to be endemic and a weakened state will collapse at some point in the 
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future.  The lessons of transition in Iraq have been won at a tremendous price in human 
life.  These lessons must be heeded.  They must inform balanced policies in Iraq to 
address the roots of resistance, to stem their violent symptoms, and to produce a political 
end-state that can be maintained by Iraqis.  These solutions will require courage and 
perseverance on the part of Iraqis, Americans, and coalition partners around the world.  
We cannot turn our back on the Iraqi people, nor can we forgive ourselves for giving up 
the vision of a stable Iraq that so many have died for. 
Looking forward, scholars, analysts and statesmen must scan beyond the surface 
of troubled regimes.  Whether looking for a change of regime, or attempting to assist 
others in their quest for a better future through democratic opening, simple solutions are 
unlikely to last.  Transition is a complex event, in which the lasting legacies of the old 
regime confront the new realities that demand change.  In order to help others navigate 
the contentious landscape that such a transition must travel, we must look beyond the 
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